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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper surveys the recent literature which examines 
the impact of business climate variables on productivity 
and growth in developing countries using enterprise 
surveys. Comparable enterprise surveys today cover 
some 70,000 firms in over 100 countries around the 
world. The literature that has analyzed this data provides 
evidence that a good business climate drives growth 
by encouraging investment and higher productivity. 
Various infrastructure, finance, security, competition 
and regulation variables have been shown to significantly 
This paper—a product of the Research Support Unit, Development Research Department—is part of a larger effort by the 
World Bank to use enterprise surveys to identify constraints on productivity and growth in developing countries. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. For information, contact jdethier@
worldbank.org.
impact firm performance. Section 1 of this paper outlines 
the theoretical framework that underpins the investment 
climate literature. Section 2 describes the available 
datasets and surveys the key findings of the empirical 
literature, first macroeconomic and then microeconomic 
studies. Particular attention is paid to the robustness 
of the reported results. Section 3 highlights important 
econometric issues common to this literature and 
suggests a research agenda and possible improvements in 
survey design.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explaining Enterprise Performance in Developing Countries  
with Business Climate Survey Data 
 
 
 
Jean-Jacques Dethier,  
Maximilian Hirn  
and  
Stéphane Straub 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: L5, O4, O12 
Keywords:  Investment Climate. Growth and Productivity. Economic Development. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1   J.J. Dethier (jdethier@worldbank.org) and M. Hirn (mhirn@worldbank.org) are with DEC, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. and S. Straub (stephane.straub@univ-tlse1.fr) with Arqade, Toulouse School of 
Economics, Toulouse.  
Introduction 
  
This is a survey paper of the literature discussing the impact of the business climate on 
productivity and growth in developing countries. In recent years, an unprecedented data 
collection effort has yielded a set of comparable enterprise surveys covering close to 
70,000 firms from over 100 countries in all continents. As a result, a number of studies 
have started to analyze the impact of the business climate variables contained in these 
surveys on different dimensions of firm performance. The general aim of this literature is 
to generate policy prescriptions based on the identification of the main constraints facing 
firms. Although many of these studies identify relevant constraints, contradictory or 
fragile results are also found, pointing to some weaknesses in the methodology applied in 
some papers as well as in the original survey questionnaire design itself.  
 
The objectives of this paper are to review the literature, take stock of the lessons learned, 
highlight strengths and shortcomings, and propose potential improvements. To do so, we 
start by providing a theoretical framework to think about the impact of the business 
climate on productivity and growth in developing countries (Section 1). We then survey 
the existing empirical literature that is based on investment climate survey data. We 
discuss the empirical macro literature in order to put the firm level investment climate 
studies into context.  The main findings of the micro literature are then outlined, and the 
robustness of the results considered (Section 2). Finally, we highlight the main 
econometric issues raised by the current literature, put forward a number of ideas to 
advance research on the investment climate and suggest possible improvements in survey 
design (Section 3). 
 
 
Section 1. Economic Growth and the Business Climate 
 
This first section describes the general theory of the business climate and outlines a 
theoretical model linking critical variables with economic performance and growth.  A 
number of structural, institutional, and behavioral variables shape and drive economic 
growth.  The critical variables that collectively define the so-called business or 
investment climate are, broadly speaking, (1) infrastructure, (2) access to finance, (3) 
security (absence of corruption and crime) and (4) the regulatory framework, including 
competition policies and the protection of property rights. The main hypothesis of the 
investment climate literature is that the business climate affects activity throughout the 
economy—particularly incentives to invest. An improvement in the business climate 
increases returns to current lines of activity and so increases investment in these. It also 
creates new opportunities – for example, through trade or access to new technology. It 
influences the psychology of entrepreneurs – the Keynesian ‘animal spirits – affecting 
their assessment of whether innovation will pay off. It puts competitive pressure on firms 
that have enjoyed privileged positions as a result of import or other protection, or special 
access to government officials. As a result of greater competition, it may cause some 
firms, perhaps those closer to technological frontiers, to shine—even as others fail.  
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Given the complexity of effects that changes in the business climate elicit, different 
firms, industries, and regions will be affected in different ways. Moreover, business 
climate–fueled growth is not simply a shift toward some technological frontier. 
Developing countries must overcome or reduce all kinds of obstacles to efficiency, 
dynamic and otherwise, without any illusions that the economy will soon arrive at a 
frontier. Indeed, changes in the investment climate may have their most crucial impact far 
from the technological frontier. 
A weak business climate, on the other hand, may not only discourage investment, it can 
also lead businesses to take costly or counterproductive steps to defend themselves from 
the consequences of its weaknesses. If social order and control are weak, firms typically 
have to invest heavily in defensive measures such as private security (as in parts of Latin 
America or the former Soviet Union). If the power supply is unreliable, firms will invest 
in their own generating capacity (as in many parts of South Asia). If it is difficult to get 
goods through or to ports, trade is discouraged (as in many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa) and larger, more costly inventories are held. Many such constraints on 
development are not quickly or easily reversed. 
To formalize the idea of an economy in which the business climate significantly impacts 
output and productivity – the key hypothesis in the recent literature – it makes sense to 
present a simple aggregate model that explicitly includes the business climate, using an 
approach that is standard in endogenous growth theory.2 It should be noted that aggregate 
growth models inevitably involve production possibility frontiers, and as discussed, in 
developing economies crucial economic gains may take place far from some hypothetical 
technological or efficiency frontier. Moreover, more specific questions may have to 
appeal to different and more disaggregated models – each with its own insights – rather 
than shoehorning all interesting phenomena into one particular model. The following 
aggregate model, however, does provide a broad sense of the main economic 
relationships investigated by the literature surveyed below. Even microeconomic studies 
that focus exclusively on firm level variations in productivity and growth implicitly 
hypothesize a macro relationship of this type in the aggregate.  
Suppose that output, Y, is a function of the capital stock, K, labor, L, and the business 
climate, as measured by a single variable M. We write this function, where t is time, as: 
(1) Y = e t·α(M) F (K, M) 
Note that we implicitly distinguish between the non-infrastructure aggregate capital 
stock, K, and the infrastructure capital stock KI, which is a determinant of M.3 As the 
output function is written here, the business climate affects both output and productivity 
levels, through the function F( ), and the rate of change of output, through the function α( 
). To keep things simple, we can portray the rate of change of the business climate in the 
model as being governed by: 
(2) 
•
M = g (μ, M(μ, x), Y), 
                                                 
2  See Aghion and Howitt, 1998. Also Stern, Dethier and Rogers, 2005: 207. 
3 Straub, S. 2008: 6-8 
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where μ is a vector of policy actions government can take, x is a vector of all other 
factors determining the investment climate, and g is the function that converts these 
inputs into the change in M.  While policy can cause immediate, discrete changes in M, 
say if there is a one-off change in the law, it also acts through the rate of change of M. 
The rate of change of M can depend on both M itself and the level of income in the 
society (see below). We also assume that: 
(3) 
•
K  = h(sY, M) 
where s is the aggregate savings rate, meaning that the capital stock increases with 
savings in the economy. Moreover, as Durlauf et al. (2008) have pointed out, the 
investment climate can also affect physical capital accumulation rates by influencing 
decisions to invest.  
Finally, we model the rate of change in the labor force as a function of population growth 
n, and the investment climate. Changes in the investment climate as defined here can 
have profound implications for labor force growth, for instance, if regulations with 
respect to foreign workers are amended (causing an influx or exodus of foreign labor), or 
if infrastructure development connects regions with low labor force participation rates 
with more dynamic ones. 
(4)  
•
L  = i(n, M) 
These four equations describe a dynamic growth model with three state variables, K, L 
and M. 
The growth rate can be increased by policy, captured in the vector μ, which improves the 
business climate directly, and by shifting the rate of change of M. An increase in M can 
increase both the growth rate, through α( ), and the level of productivity, directly through 
F( ). Improvements in the business climate could generate further improvements through 
political economy mechanisms if they increase the number of people and firms with a 
stake in a better climate. For example, if trade reforms create an export-oriented sector of 
the economy, that sector may increase pressure for further reforms to trade policy or 
trade-related infrastructure. And higher incomes might lead to pressure for an improved 
business climate in other ways, as people seek rules governing the protection of wealth or 
capital (hence the presence of Y in function g( ) in equation 2). The model could in 
principle capture phenomena such as an endogenous business climate and virtuous (or 
vicious) circles of growth. We could also generalize the notation to cover a vector of 
capital goods, vintage models, many dimensions of the business climate, and so on.  
To the extent that (changes in) the business climate affect different firms differently, the 
aggregate model, with its reliance on a representative firm, is not adequate. As stressed in 
Banerjee and Duflo (2005), such a model can hardly account for the behavior of firms in 
a world where either markets or governments fail, or people face psychological 
difficulties to take advantage of opportunities. In such a case, the impact of constraints 
such as infrastructure limitations, lack of access to finance, or political economy issues 
on individual firm’s decisions can be analyzed in non-aggregative models. Relatively 
simple, distinct, disaggregated models, addressing the relevant constraints of interest, can 
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provide a variety of insights. As Section 2 will demonstrate, the empirical studies that 
exploit data from investment climate surveys, while usually implicitly set in a macro 
context as the one described by our model, are examples of the added value provided by a 
disaggregated, microeconomic approach.  
 
Section 2. Survey of Recent Enterprise-Level Business Climate Studies 
 
Firm-level enterprise and business climate data has proved a rich resource for research on 
the characteristics and constraints of firms in the developing and transitioning world. This 
section surveys the recent literature with a focus on empirical work that exploits the data 
to explain firm performance as a function of different aspects of the business climate. 
Sub-section 1 places the recent micro-level business climate literature into the context of 
the macro-studies that largely preceded it, thus highlighting the place of the firm-level 
literature as a whole and the added value it provides. Sub-section 2 discusses the 
available datasets. Sub-section 3 outlines the most serious econometric challenges 
encountered throughout the firm-level literature. Sub-section 4 then presents the key 
results of the literature for the four main sets of business climate variables that have been 
investigated: (1) Infrastructure, (2) Financial Constraints, (3) Corruption and Crime and 
(4) Competition and Regulation.  
 
 
1. Firm Level Analyses in the Context of the Macro-Institutions Literature  
 
The microeconomic business climate literature surveyed here is framed by more macro-
oriented analyses. It is useful to briefly contrast the two literatures to put the firm-level 
studies into context and better understand their specific potential and advantages. The 
macro-literature has provided some interesting insight, but is characterized by a number 
of inherent limitations that microeconomic studies can help overcome.  
 
The macroeconomic literature has generally attempted to use cross-country samples to 
explain GDP-based outcome variables4 with broad, country-level indicators of 
institutional quality, the policy environment and infrastructure. The majority of such 
analyses have found significant effects of these variables on economic performance, even 
though recent studies have been more cautious in their interpretation of the evidence. 
  
In a review paper for the European Investment Bank, Romp and de Haan (2005) find the 
consensus view in the macro-literature to be that ‘public capital furthers economic 
growth’.5 With respect to institutions and the policy environment, Pande and Udry (2005) 
speak of ‘compelling evidence’ and a ‘persuasive case’ that  
 
‘long run growth is faster in countries that have higher quality contracting 
institutions, better law enforcement, increased protection of private property 
rights, improved central government bureaucracy, smoother operating formal 
                                                 
4 Typically GDP per capita (e.g. in Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001), GDP per worker (e.g. in Hall & Jones, 
1999), or the growth rates of these two variables (e.g. in Knack & Keefer, 1995, or Mauro, 1995).   
5 Romp and de Haan, 2005: 52  
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sector financial markets, increased levels of democracy, and higher levels of 
trust’6 
 
Likewise, Dollar et al. (2005) state that a ‘range of empirical studies…find a relationship 
between long-run growth…and measures of institutional quality’7. The World 
Development Report 2005 underlines that the macro-analyses ‘generated useful insights – 
the most important is that secure property rights and good governance are central to 
economic growth.’8  
 
A recent paper by Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan (2008) is more cautious. Investigating ‘the 
strength of empirical evidence for various growth theories when there is model 
uncertainty with respect to the correct growth model’9, the authors judge that ‘previous 
findings on the direct importance of institutions to growth are fragile’10. They do, 
however, conclude that there is at least ‘some evidence that institutions…play a role as 
determinants of growth rates’ even if ‘their effect is likely to flow through their influence 
on physical capital accumulation rates and not via TFP growth directly.’11 Straub, 
Vellutini and Warlters (2008) find some evidence for a positive effect of infrastructure on 
growth, especially in poorer countries, but conclude that in general, the ‘results from 
studies using aggregate data lack robustness’12. Romp and de Haan (2005) highlight that 
recent estimations of infrastructure elasticities are much lower than earlier calculations 
that did not account for endogeneity effects appropriately.13 Some econometric problems, 
such as the failure to account for model uncertainty in cross-section studies14, persist in 
the literature. Moreover, Romp and de Haan underline the considerable heterogeneity of 
the results across economies, arguing that the precise ‘channels through which 
infrastructure affects economic growth’15 are still not understood very well. The 
consensus view that a broadly defined ‘business climate – institutions, infrastructure and 
the social environment – significantly affect economic performance is thus qualified by 
lingering concerns about the robustness and generality of specific results and the precise 
channels through which the estimated effects occur.  
 
The macroeconomic approach is characterized by a number of inherent limitations that 
suggest that microeconomic, firm-level analyses are required to achieve more robust 
results and more precise policy recommendations. These inherent limitations of the 
macro-literature include:  
 
                                                 
6 Pande, R. and C. Udry. 2005: 31. 
7 Dollar, D., M. Hallward-Driemeier and T. Mengistae. 2005: 22. 
8 World Bank. 2004: p.25; 
9 Durlauf, S.N., A. Kourtellos and C.M. Tan. 2008: 329. 
10 Ibid.:338. 
11 Ibid.: 342. 
12 Straub, S., C. Vellutini and M. Warlters. 2008: 23. 
13 This is primarily because conceptual and econometric problems such as reverse causality or inefficient proxy 
variables have been at least partly addressed in more modern studies. 
14 Romp, W. and J. de Haan. 2005: 57. 
15 Ibid.: 58. 
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o The explanatory variables at the country level obscure important dimensions of 
heterogeneity such as variations across different regions within a country16 and/or 
across different types of firms (by firm size, firm age and so on). 
o The limited number of countries restricts the sample size of country-level analyses, 
especially cross-sectional ones, and thus the robustness of the results.17 
o Aggregate business climate indicators are often imprecise, rely on de jure 
information, or subjective judgments about the weighting of variable components, 
and lack direct input about actual conditions as experienced by affected parties such 
as firms. 
o Many country level indicators ‘contain little or no variation over time and thus are 
completely or almost indistinguishable from country-, sector- or region-specific 
effects that may reflect other features than the business environment.’18 
o The instruments most often used consist of geographical or historical pre-conditions 
(latitude, colonial history, settler mortality, etc.), which limits the ability of the 
empirical models to identify the consequences of institutional change for growth.19 
 
Thus Durlauf et al. (2008) state that ‘it is most likely the case that the limits to what 
information can be extracted from aggregate regressions requires more attention to 
microeconomic and historical studies’20. Similarly, Straub (2008) argues that ‘the main 
limitation [of the macroeconomic literature] is …the fact that the interesting questions 
cannot be addressed with data at that level of aggregation’21. Pande and Udry (2005) 
highlight that ‘this [macro] literature has served its purpose and is essentially complete’ 
and argue for the necessity of ‘empirical research based on micro-data in development 
economics’ to ‘make progress’22. The World Development Report 2005 underlines that 
these ‘limits [of macroeconomic analyses] inspired the search for more disaggregated 
evidence on the quality of a location’s business climate and …the impact of that climate 
on the investment decisions and performance of firms.’23 
 
The crucial pre-requisite for finding ‘more disaggregated evidence’ is the availability of 
raw disaggregated data. The following section will introduce the main firm-level datasets 
on which almost the entire micro-literature on business climate is based.  
                                                 
16 Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae. 2005: 2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Commander and Svejnar. 2007: 3. 
19 Pande and Udry. 2005: 8. 
20 Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan. 2008: 344. 
21 Straub, 2008: p.35. 
22 Pande and Udry. 2005: 3 and 31. 
23 World Bank. 2004: 21. 
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2. Datasets 
 
Overview of Existing Datasets 
 
Before the 1990s, standardized firm-level business surveys spanning multiple countries 
were practically non-existent. This began to change with an initial series of largely self-
contained projects which carried out business surveys for certain sets of countries and 
with various thematic scopes.  
 
Four key projects of that period were sponsored by the World Bank: First, a first set of 
Africa-focused surveys carried out from 1992 to 1995 by the Africa Regional Program on 
Enterprise Development (RPED); second, the first round of the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) for 22 transition countries in 1999; third, 
the World Business Environment Surveys (WBES), implemented for 80 countries and the 
West Bank/Gaza territories from late 1998 to early 2000; fourth, a number of Firm 
Analysis and Competitiveness Surveys (FACS) in the Development Economics Research 
Group (DECRG). While these projects yielded unprecedented and highly useful data for 
the countries and issues they were designed for, they suffered from limited comparability 
amongst each other due to differing questionnaire designs and priorities.  
 
The key development of the early 2000s was a push for greater standardization in order to 
build up a single, centralized database of comparable business climate surveys from 
around the world. For this purpose, a set of core questions was ‘pooled and 
consolidated’24 from the earlier surveys. This set of core questions became the crucial 
component of the new, standardized business climate questionnaires known as 
Productivity and Business climate Surveys (PICS). In a specific country survey, around 
50-60% will consist of the core modules (some 80 questions), the rest of nationally 
specific ones that can be added flexibly to the core instrument depending on each 
country’s data needs. The core instrument was also partly incorporated into the latest 
rounds of surveys that had started earlier, for instance BEEPS, the second and third round 
of which contain most of the core PICS questions.   
 
Launched in 2001, 25 the new PICS surveys have been used to acquire detailed firm-level 
data in 15 to 20 countries a year. The results have been collected in a central database 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org) along with those of earlier, comparable projects such as 
BEEPS II and III. All surveys in this database are now commonly referred to as 
Enterprise Surveys (ES),26 although the old terminology (PICS, BEEPS etc.) persists to 
some extent. The database currently holds information from almost 70,000 firms from 
                                                 
24 http://iresearch.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate [‘About ICS’, 07/22/2008]  
25 Hallward-Driemeier, M. and R. Aterido. 2007. [http://www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/docs/158/Hallward-
Driemeier.pdf, 07/21/2008]: 5. 
26 Not to be confused with the World Business Environment Surveys (WBES) mentioned above, which were a one-off 
project in 1999-2000.  
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over 100 countries in six different regions. Aterido et al. (2007) have outlined key 
features of the database in a recent paper: 27 
 
‘The median sample size is 350 firms, with several large countries having 
substantially larger samples…The sample of firms in each country is stratified by 
size, sector and location…The unit of analysis is the “Establishment” in the 
manufacture and service sectors. Most firms are registered with local authorities, 
although they may be only in partial compliance with labor and tax authorities.’ 
 
The core questions are generally answered by the manager or owner of the establishment 
in face-to-face interviews. Accounting data may be provided by the establishment’s 
accountant and/or human resource manager. Some countries have attached nationally 
specific modules answered by workers (for instance the Thailand 2007 PICS survey). 
Among the earlier surveys, there is still some variation of the core questions, so that 
comparative analyses of multiple business climate variables may require a focus on a 
subset of the total database. Aterido et al. suggest a highly comparable subset of around 
50,000 firms in 80 countries.28  
 
Structure and Content of the Core Business Climate Survey Instrument 
 
The standardized core survey instrument is organized into two distinct parts.29 The first 
part provides general information about the firm and the business climate it faces. The 
second part collects accounting information such as production costs, investment flows, 
balance sheet information and workforce statistics. The questions about the firm and the 
business climate in the first part include:  
 
- General information about the firm:  age, ownership, activities, location.  
- Sales and supplies:  imports and exports, supply and demand conditions, competition. 
- Business climate constraints: evaluation of general obstacles 
- Infrastructure and services: power, water, transport, computers, business services 
- Finance: sources of finance, terms of finance, financial services, auditing, land 
ownership 
- Labor relations: worker skills, status and training; skill availability; over-employment; 
unionization and strikes 
- Business-government relations: quality of public services, consistency of policy and 
administration, customs processing, regulatory compliance costs (management time, 
delays, bribes), informality, capture. 
- Conflict resolution/legal environment: confidence in legal system, resolution of credit 
disputes 
- Crime: security costs, cost of crimes, use and performance of police services 
- Capacity, innovation, learning: utilization, new products, planning horizon, sources of 
technology, worker and management education and experience. 
 
                                                 
27 Hallward-Driemeier, M.; and R. Aterido. 2007: 20. See also: Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 
2007: 10-11. 
28 : Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 10. 
29 PICS Implementation Manual (Nov. 2003) http://iresearch.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate/Help/pics_manual.pdf 
[07/21/2008] 
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Both subjective perceptions of managers and objective data on various business climate 
indicators are recorded.  
 
Box 1: Basic infrastructure variables – subjective and objective 
 
With respect to basic infrastructure, there is one key subjective perceptions variable in the core 
survey. It includes three indicators:  electricity, transport and telecommunications. 
 
• Rate whether the following issues are a problem for the operation and growth of your 
business on a five point scale from ‘No Obstacle’ up to ‘Very Severe Obstacle’: (a) 
Telecommunications, (b) Electricity, (c)Transportation (d) … [14 other non-infrastructure 
issues incl. customs/trade regulation, labor regulation etc.]  
 
There are also a number of objective indicators: 
 
• During how many days last year did your establishment experience the following service 
interruptions, how long did they last, and what percent of your total sales value was lost last 
year due to: (a) power outages or surges from the public grid? (b) insufficient water supply?; 
(c) unavailable mainline telephone service? 
• Does your establishment own or share a generator? If yes, what percentage of your 
electricity comes from your own or a shared generator? 
• What share of your firm’s water supply do you get from public sources?  
• What percentage of the value of your average cargo consignment is lost while in transit due 
to breakage, theft or spoilage? 
• Does your enterprise regularly use e-mail or a website in its interactions with clients and 
suppliers 
• Based on the experience of your establishment over the last two years, what is the actual 
delay experienced (from the day you applied to the day you received the service or approval) 
and was a gift or informal payment asked for or expected to obtain each of the following?    
(a) A mainline telephone connection, (b) An electrical connection, (c) A water connection; 
(d)… [three other non-infrastructure issues] 
 
Specific national surveys may add infrastructure questions to augment the core-instrument. Moreover, 
some changes to the core instrument have been made over time, thus some surveys include additional 
indicators, in the case of infrastructure for instance: 
 
• What is your average cost of a kilowatt-hour (KwH) of electricity from the public grid? 
• If yes [on generator ownership], what was the generator’s original cost to your establishment? 
 
 
There has been considerable debate about possible weaknesses of subjective, perception-
based indicators compared to objective, quantitative data. Concerns have been raised 
whether subjective data may be vulnerable to ‘waves of pessimism and euphoria’, to 
inconsistencies across regions and countries because firms compare themselves to 
different benchmarks (so called “anchoring effects”30), or to managers’ inability to form 
accurate subjective estimates.31 For instance, managers may fail to separate internal 
weaknesses of the firm (e.g. inability to provide proper documentation) from external 
business climate constraints (e.g. inefficient bureaucracy. These problems are a specific 
concern when conducting econometric estimations based on cross-sectional data, and 
                                                 
30 See for example Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001. 
31 Gelb, Ramachandran, Kedia-Shah and Turner. 2007: 2. 
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addressing them may require the use of panel data to control for individuals’ or firms’ 
fixed effects. 
 
Exploring such concerns, Gelb et al. (2007) examine subjective data yielded by the core 
Enterprise Survey perceptions-question cited in Box 1. They conclude that while 
‘perceptions of critical business climate constraints may not always correspond fully to 
“objective” reality’, firms ‘do not complain indiscriminately’ and response ‘patterns 
correlate reasonably well with several other country-level indicators related to the 
business climate’. Likewise, Aterido et al. (2007) underline that: 
 
‘subjective rankings are highly correlated with objective measures in 16 of the 17 
variables [and] also significantly correlated with external sources, including 
Doing Business indicators. Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) use 38 countries and 
confirm that countries with more restrictive labor regulations are associated with 
higher shares of firms reporting labor regulations as constraining’32 
 
However, even if objective and subjective measures are significantly correlated, it is 
important to remember that the latter remain prone to bias. For example, a study by 
Olken (2006) compares corruption perceptions among villagers in Indonesia with 
objective measures of corruption in road construction projects. It shows that although 
subjective and objective measures are positively correlated, there are also systematic 
individual-level biases in the latter. Similar issues are very likely to arise in firm-level 
surveys.  
  
In spite of these problems, subjective indicators can still play a useful role in identifying 
important constraints through descriptive statistics. For instance, Carlin, Schaffer and 
Seabright (2006) have highlighted the ease with which a subjective ranking of constraints 
by firms allows a comparison of the importance of different constraints. This is not 
readily possible with objective indicators that measure various elements of the business 
climate in variable-specific units.33 For instance, it is much easier to directly ask firms to 
rank the perceived severity of the constraint posed by the power supply relative to 
corruption, rather than trying to rank it based on two objective measures such as the 
number of power outages relative to the amount of bribes paid. Carlin et al. also argue 
that while over-optimism or pessimism may affect estimates of the absolute level of 
measured constraint severity, there is no reason to think that average differences between 
constraint rankings are likely to be biased. Thus subjective data may be helpful to shed 
light on the relative importance of different constraints within economies. However, even 
if they can play an important complementary role, subjective indicators are probably less 
useful than objective ones in standard econometric analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 11-12. 
33 Carlin, W., M.E. Schaffer and P. Seabright. 2006: 13. 
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3. The Enterprise-Level Literature on Business Climate: Recent Results 
 
This subsection summarizes the most important results of the recent business climate 
literature which relates firm performance to investment climate indicators. Given that 
many studies have very specific and limited samples, one must be careful before drawing 
general conclusions. However, a large variety of samples can be shown to yield 
essentially similar or complementary results. The subsection is structured by types of 
constraints, looking in turn at ‘Basic Infrastructure’ (Electricity, Telecommunications, 
Transport, Water), ‘Financial Constraints’, ‘Corruption and Crime’ and ‘Competition and 
Regulation’. In each case, a summary of relevant descriptive statistics precedes a review 
of the regression results.  
 
Basic Infrastructure 
  
Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (2006) have analyzed descriptive statistics based on 
subjective indicators from 55 Enterprise Surveys.34 As reported in Box 1, the main 
perceptions question of the ES core instrument asks about three basic infrastructure 
indicators – electricity, telecommunications and transportation. Among the three, 
electricity emerges as the most important perceived infrastructure problem.35 It is viewed 
as a particularly severe problem in the poorest countries of the sample, including 9 out of 
10 African nations36, 4 out of 5 South Asian countries37, Kosovo and Albania. Gelb et al. 
(2007) confirm that electricity constraints decrease in perceived severity as GDP per 
capita rises.  
 
Perceived Severity of Electricity Constraint (0 to 3 scale) by Country Income Groups 38 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (2006) calculate a relative and an absolute measure of the importance of particular 
constraints. The relative measure calculates the importance of each constraint relative to the average perceived 
constraint severity of the country in question. Each constraint is then ranked by the total number of countries in which 
it is perceived as more severe than average. The absolute measure ranks constraints by the number of countries for 
which the constraint is ranked higher than the average perceived severity of all constraints in all countries (2.2). 
35 Ibid.: p.15. 
36 The exception is South Africa 
37 The exception is Oman 
38 Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright. 2006: 6.  Country income classification is from the World Bank, July 2005, based on 
GNI. Note that Carlin et al. state that the graph is based on a 0 to 3 scale, however, the actual question in the core 
survey uses a 0 to 4 scale. It is not clear whether this is an error or whether Carlin et al. amended the original scale.  
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With the exception of Ireland, transport is rated as an above average constraint only in ‘a 
handful of poor or war torn economies’. Telecommunications does not appear at all in 
Carlin et al.’s main ranking, possibly indicating the extent to which the rapid spread of 
mobile phones has reduced the importance of this constraint. It also underlines the need 
to update the objective survey questions referring to ‘mainline’ telephone services only.   
 
An analysis of infrastructure statistics based on objective indicators is provided by Lee 
and Anas (1992) and Lee, Anas and Oh (1996; 1999) for Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Thailand. Their analyses are not based on the standard Enterprise Survey (ES) data, but 
on three dedicated surveys that were carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
infrastructure information they collected, however, is very similar to the one available in 
the ES database.39  
 
Lee et al. focus on the incidence of public infrastructure deficiencies, the extent of private 
provision responses to these deficiencies and the costs thereby imposed. They find large 
variations in the availability and quality of public infrastructure across the three 
countries, across regions within the countries and across firm sizes. In general, Nigeria 
tended to have a worse public infrastructure performance and a correspondingly higher 
incidence of private provision than Thailand and Indonesia. The authors speculate that 
the comparatively worse problems in Nigeria are related to the country’s (then) tighter 
restrictions on private provision arrangements. Aimed at protecting inefficient public 
suppliers, these restrictions prevented the emergence of private infrastructure provision 
regimes more efficient than the simple ‘one firm, one generator’ model. 40 The authors 
argue in favor of ‘[opening] up the markets for power, water and other various 
infrastructure services’ in order to improve service reliability and reduce system 
congestion.41 However, Lee et al. do not explore this suggestion in detail and do not 
discuss possible implications and problems (such as equity-efficiency trade-offs).  
 
A key finding of the study is the disproportionate way in which smaller firms are affected 
by infrastructure deficiencies. In all three countries, small firms relied far more on the 
public supply than larger ones and were thus subject to the bulk of the power failure 
incidents.42 Lee et al. argue that this was not because the ‘burden of poor electricity or 
water supplies is less per unit of output’ for smaller firms, but rather due to economies of 
scale in private provision of electricity and water, which means it is relatively cheaper for 
larger firms to avoid the public system and provide their own power and water. This 
result finds support in the much broader analyses of 80+ Enterprise Surveys by Aterido et 
al. (2007) who examine the deviation of perceived constraints from the average ranking. 
They find that small firms report electricity as a greater relative constraint than larger 
firms.43 The authors make the intuitive argument that smaller firms are ‘more likely to be 
                                                 
39 The key descriptive statistics can be calculated in both cases: number of firms that own a generator; number of firms 
that own a private well; production time and sales value lost due to public infrastructure interruptions et cetera. 
Stratification and sample sizes are also similar in both cases (a couple of hundred enterprises per country and year, 
stratified by industries, regions/cities and firm size). 
40 Lee, K.S., A. Anas and G. Oh. 1999: 2141. 
41 Ibid.: 2149. 
42 Ibid.: 2138. See also World Bank (2004): Box 6.10. 
43 Note that Figure 6.4 in the World Development Report 2005 shows that a greater percentage of large than small 
firms rank infrastructure constraints as ‘major’ or ‘severe’. However, this is not inconsistent with smaller firms 
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in areas without access to electricity or to be dependent on an unreliable public grid’44, 
given that they lack the scale economies to operate a generator efficiently. Lee et al.  
(1999) suggest that since a very large share of new jobs in developing countries are 
created by small firms, the negative impact of infrastructure deficiencies on employment 
creation is potentially huge.45 Regrettably, the potential links between the disproportional 
infrastructure problems of small firms and job creation are not followed up by the authors 
and no tentative cost estimates in terms of jobs are provided. 
 
Lee et al.’s analyses demonstrate the concrete insights that can be gained from descriptive 
firm-level statistics of infrastructure variables. Their specific results are somewhat dated 
by now, but the concerns they address remain relevant today. The Enterprise Survey 
database, which contains similar statistics for more than 100 countries, is an extremely 
valuable new resource in that respect.  
 
While descriptive statistics are useful to establish basic facts, regression analyses have 
provided a more detailed view of the relationship between infrastructure and firm 
performance indicators. Escribano and Guasch (2005) use ES data from Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua to calculate ten different measures of firm productivity. The 
productivity measures are then regressed on a number of controls as well as a broad array 
of objective business climate variables of which four are infrastructure indicators - the 
log of average duration of power outages, the log of the number of days to clear customs 
for imports, the log of shipment losses as fraction of sales as well as a dummy for internet 
access. The regressions are carried out both for a pooled sample and for each of the three 
countries separately. The authors find that in all regressions the infrastructure variables 
always have the expected signs, and the vast majority is significant. The authors are 
confident enough in their results to interpret the elasticities straightforwardly, noting that 
for the pooled sample: 
 
‘a one percent increase in the average duration (hours per day) of power outages 
decreases productivity between 0.02 and 0.1 percent, depending on the 
productivity measure used. It mainly affects old plants…a one percent increase in 
the fraction of shipment losses will decrease productivity between 1.23 and 2.53 
percent. This is most important in old and small firms…firms with access to 
internet are between 11% and 15% more productive [than] those firms without’46 
 
Escribano and Guasch go to great length to avoid bias and inconsistency in their analysis. 
They take care to avoid simultaneity problems, control for country, industry and year 
effects with dummies and also including at least two firm characteristics as controls (age 
and share of imported inputs). Regressions are run on all variables at a time to avoid 
omitted variable bias. Moreover, they use region-industry averages of the IC variables as 
instruments to alleviate reverse causality. Escribano and Guasch show that infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                                 
perceiving infrastructure as a greater relative constraint. There may be structural reasons – such as larger firms’ greater 
demands on the various elements of the business climate  – that on average lead larger firms to report higher absolute 
constraint rankings in the various categories. 
44 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 15. 
45 Lee, K.S., A. Anas and G. Oh. 1999: 2140. 
46 Escribano, A.; and J. Guasch. 2005: 55. 
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has a significant impact on productivity, explaining some 9 percent of it in total – the 
second highest percentage after ‘red tape, corruption and crime’47. 
 
However, a number of points should be noted when interpreting this result. Firstly, the 
huge impact of internet access on productivity suggests that this dummy functions as a 
proxy for better equipped, higher-technology firms rather than just representing internet 
access per se.48 This advises caution when deriving policy interpretations. For instance, if 
the large productivity improvements captured by the internet dummy are actually related 
to much broader technological differences between firms, then prioritizing putting 
internet-connections into every firm could be a misguided step. Secondly, one should be 
careful not to generalize too much from these results and recall that they are based on 
only three (lower) middle income countries. The relationships may be considerably 
different in very poor countries where subjective measures indicate that electricity is a 
more severe problem.49  
 
Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu’s (2006) study underlines that specific aspects of 
infrastructure are greater constraints in some countries than in others. They use data from 
an Enterprise Survey of China to regress different firm performance indicators (TFP, 
investment rate, sales growth, employment growth) on a number of controls50 and on 
objective business climate indicators, including two infrastructure ones: loss of sales due 
to transportation or power problems, and share of employees that use computers51. The 
authors find ‘no evidence that physical infrastructure affects firm performance’ but ‘the 
impact of technological infrastructure [on productivity] appears to matter significantly’. 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. conclude that this ‘roughly’ conforms to their knowledge of 
China, which has relatively few bottlenecks in roads and power after the recent build-up 
of physical infrastructure, but still faces a ‘binding constraint’ in terms of ‘technological 
infrastructure’. 
 
In a sample of five Eastern European countries (Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Bastos and Nasir (2004) obtain a similar result as Escribano and 
Guasch. Regressing TFP on three controls (firm age, export status and ownership) and 
three aggregate business climate indicators (‘competition’, ‘infrastructure’ and ‘rent 
predation’52), they find that all three IC measures have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 1% level. ‘Infrastructure’ accounts for the second largest share of the 
variation in firm-level productivity, behind ‘competition’ but before ‘rent predation’. 
What undermines the results of Bastos and Nasir, however, is the fact that their ‘two-
                                                 
47 Ibid.: 73. 
48 Likewise, the other indicators may also capture some additional variation from unobserved variables. In essence, this 
means that there may still be some omitted variable bias that distorts the estimated parameters, or alternatively, there 
may be no (or almost no) bias, but the included variable may only be an instrument/proxy for the actual cause of the 
productivity effect. 
49 For example, the marginal impact of power outage duration on productivity could be much higher after certain 
thresholds, which may not be reached in middle-income countries.   
50 Ownership (share of ownership that is domestic private; share of ownership that is foreign), logs of firm age, city 
population and city GDP per capita 
51 in each case city-industry averages are employed to lessen reverse causality 
52 The authors use principal component analysis to obtain their aggregate indicators. See Annex 2 for the specific 
indicators on which the aggregate measures are based. 
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step’ estimation is vulnerable to simultaneity bias as pointed out by Escribano and 
Guasch. Moreover, they do not control for country effects. Thus, while their indicators 
may capture some genuine cross-country differences in the three business climate 
categories, they are also vulnerable to bias if other cross-country effects (such as trade 
policy, political instability etc.) influence productivity and are also correlated with their 
indicators.  
 
Dollar et al. (2005) use a sample of Enterprise Surveys from Bangladesh, China, India 
and Pakistan to regress total factor productivity on a number of controls and five 
objective business climate variables, including the two infrastructure indicators ‘log of 
the cost of power losses as a % of sales’ and log ‘time required to obtain a phone line’. 
The authors find that even after controlling for firm characteristics, geography variables 
and country-level effects, power losses have a significantly negative effect on 
productivity. This seems to confirm the importance of electricity in poor countries and 
more generally the significance of infrastructure for explaining variation in productivity. 
However, the telecommunications variable has a perversely positive and significant 
coefficient, but this counter-intuitive result ‘is not robust across all specifications’.   
 
Results based on firm performance variables other than productivity by and large confirm 
the significant role variations in infrastructure play in explaining differences in firm 
success. Reinikka and Svensson (2002) use the 1998 Ugandan Industrial Enterprise 
Survey for a sophisticated short study of the effects of poor infrastructure and deficient 
public services on the level of private investment. The authors first construct a model to 
garner hypotheses for the empirical analysis that follows. The model characterizes two 
decisions – whether a firm buys private, complementary infrastructure capital, and how 
much it invests in non-complementary, productive capital in the next period. The first 
empirical estimation thus runs a probit regression of ‘ownership of a generator’ on the 
number of days of power interruptions from the public grid, the firm’s employment size, 
the percentage of foreign ownership, a dummy indicating whether the firm exports part of 
its output, firm profit and age. The model hypothesis is confirmed as public power 
outages show a significantly positive relationship with the probability of owning a 
generator.53 Moreover, a firm is significantly more likely to own a generator if it is a 
larger firm, an exporter or has a higher percentage of foreign ownership. With respect to 
the investment decision, the empirical analysis also confirms the model hypotheses. For 
firms without a generator, investment is found to be negatively related to the number of 
days of power interruptions. However, ‘an increase in the number of days lost has no 
statistically significant effect on investment for firms with their own generators’54. This 
comes at a cost, however, for if the public power supply is good (i.e. conditional on few 
lost days), firms that have installed expensive private electricity infrastructure invest less 
than firms without a generator. On the whole, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) conclude 
that their analysis of Ugandan firm level data shows that poor public capital ‘significantly 
reduces productive investment by firms’.55 They deduce that a poorly functioning public 
                                                 
53 In the empirical analysis the actual public power outcomes are taken as a proxy for ex-ante beliefs of firms that 
invest in complementary private infrastructure capital in the first period. 
54 Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson. 2002: 65. 
55 Ibid.: 67. 
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infrastructure sector is likely to hinder a private supply response to more general 
macroeconomic reforms. 
 
Aterido et al. (2007) use employment growth as their dependent variable and regress on a 
large number of controls and objective business climate variables including three 
infrastructure ones: log of days with power outages, log of % of sales lost due to power 
outages and log of days without water. Their analysis is based on a sample of at least 80 
Enterprise Surveys, considerably more than other papers. With respect to infrastructure, 
the authors find a significantly negative effect of power outages on employment growth 
for medium sized firms, and at least the expected sign for small and large firms.  
 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) carry out a similar study with particular focus on 
Africa which produces interesting results. They regress employment growth on a variety 
of controls and business climate variables, including losses from power outages (% of 
sales), frequency of outages and whether a firm owns a generator as infrastructure 
indicators. They can confirm that a higher incidence of power losses is associated with a 
negative impact on employment growth. Interestingly, the authors find that African firms 
seem to have adapted to this problem to some extent so that given the frequency of 
outages, African employment growth is stronger than expected relative to the rest of the 
world. This has partly to do with the comparatively high incidence of generator 
ownership in Africa, which reduces the impact of power shortages from the public grid. 
However, another reason seems to be that a higher frequency of outages seems to have 
contributed to a disproportional concentration of African employment growth in very 
small firms, which are less capital intensive and thus less vulnerable to power outages in 
terms of employment effects.    
 
Export status – whether or not a firm exports goods abroad – has also been studied as a 
dependent variable. As trade integration has often been associated with economic growth 
– both at the firm and country level – authors have been interested to test whether a 
relationship between business climate and export status can be found. Dollar et al. (2006) 
draw on a sample of firm level surveys from Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Honduras, India, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru to carry out probit estimations of whether the probability 
that a randomly chosen firm in a particular city exports is connected to business climate 
indicators (controlling for country and a number of other variables).  They include ‘losses 
from power outages’ as their infrastructure indicator and find it to have a negative and 
significant impact on the probability of exporting in all their specifications.  
 
Datta (2008) uses Enterprise Survey data from India to investigate the effects of a 
highway improvement program on the production efficiency of firms. Datta’s paper is 
particularly interesting for the way he exploits panel data to avoid the reverse causality 
problem stemming from the fact that better economic performance may attract more 
infrastructure, rather than more infrastructure causing firms’ efficiency to improve. Datta 
argues that if 
 
‘the precise route of the highway was not manipulated to include some 
intermediate areas (counties, districts, cities) and exclude others based on factors 
correlated with the outcomes of interest, then the highway construction can be 
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treated as exogenous to the areas that the highway runs through…This allows for 
a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, where changes in relevant 
outcomes for affected firms are compared to the corresponding outcomes for 
firms whose location precluded their directly benefiting from the highway 
program’56 
 
Datta argues that since the highway improvement program in question used the most 
direct routes between its destinations, and because no ‘opting out’ was possible and no 
realignments carried out, the areas in between the destinations can indeed be viewed as a 
quasi-random selection of locations with existing highways to which the upgrade 
‘treatment’ was applied. Datta finds that firms that profited from the upgrade held 
significantly lower inventories, became less likely to report transportation as a major or 
severe problem, and showed a greater propensity to change suppliers between the two 
years (suggesting they found more suitable ones). This is interpreted as evidence that 
‘improved highways facilitated productive choices’, ‘eased the extent to…which 
transportation infrastructure constrains firms’ and allowed them to ‘produce more 
efficiently’57. 
 
Papers that find no significant effects of infrastructure indicators on firm performance are 
in the minority, and generally have very specific samples or clear methodological 
limitations. For instance, Commander and Svejnar (2007) use a sample of BEEPS 
surveys (round II and III) to regress firm revenues on a number of controls and subjective 
business climate variables, including a composite ‘infrastructure’ one based on the 
perceptions question reproduced in Box 1. They do find that perceived infrastructure 
constraints have a negative and significant effect on firm revenue – but only without 
controls for country fixed effects. The authors conclude quite generally that only country 
effects (due partly to differences in infrastructure, partly to other unobserved 
heterogeneities) have an impact, while within-country differences in infrastructure do not. 
However, this seems like a premature conclusion given the significant within-country 
effects found in many other studies, that the sample is limited to Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia and only subjective indicators were used.  
 
Fisman and Svensson (2005) use an Ugandan dataset to test whether firm sales growth is 
explained by corruption and taxation, controlling for a number of variables including an 
composite index of ‘public services’ (electricity, water, telephone, waste disposal, paved 
roads). Although this index has the expected positive sign (a higher index number 
standing for better infrastructure), it is not individually significant. 
 
Competition and Regulation 
 
The view that competition and entry should promote efficiency and prosperity ‘has now 
become…common wisdom worldwide.’58 Generally speaking, this view would lead us to 
expect a positive effect of competition on firm performance, and a negative effect of 
(excessive) regulation. Studies based on business climate survey data have predominantly 
                                                 
56 Datta, S. 2008: 2-3. [Italics are the author’s] 
57 Ibid.: 4 and 15. 
58 Aghion and Griffith. 2005: 1. 
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focused on using existing local or cross-country differences in regulatory outcomes to 
explain firm performance. There is still a lack of panel analyses which could estimate the 
impact of changes (i.e. reforms) in the same regulatory framework(s) over time. This is 
partly due to the still small number of Enterprise Survey rounds, which restricts the size 
of available panel datasets.. 
 
Carlin et al.’s (2006) examination of descriptive statistics based on subjective Enterprise 
Survey variables from some 60 countries shows that anti-competitive practices are ranked 
as of greater than average importance in all of their country groups. Alan Gelb et al. 
(2007) look at two types of (subjective) indicators of regulation – tax administration and 
labor regulations. The results yielded by their subjective Enterprise Survey data are quite 
intuitive. Like corruption and crime, tax administration is perceived as a problem 
primarily in developing countries in the middle income range.59 As one moves further up 
in the income level, labor regulations are more often perceived as severe constraint. Gelb 
et al. argue that policies ‘become more serious determinants of the business climate at 
this stage, largely because the state has stronger capacity to implement them.’60 The 
World Development Report 2005 cites some evidence that larger firms spend more time 
dealing with officials and are inspected more often61: 
 
 
 
Bastos and Nasir’s (2004) analysis of BEEPS data regresses productivity on an aggregate 
‘competition’ variable based on four subjective and one objective indicator62. They find a 
strongly positive and significant impact of competition on productivity. Indeed, 
competition is shown to explain a far larger part of the variation in firm performance than 
their ‘rent predation’ and ‘infrastructure’ variables. They conclude that this 
 
‘finding suggests that the relatively quick steps governments can take to 
increase competition will have a big payoff in firm performance – even as 
the slow, expensive process of upgrading infrastructure takes place. It also 
                                                 
59 Gelb, A., V. Ramachandran, M. Kedia-Shah and G. Turner. 2007: 13-14. 
60 Ibid.: 15. 
61 World Bank. 2004: 100. 
62 i) & ii) Importance of domestic competition for decisions to: a.  introduce new products, b. reduce costs; iii) & iv) 
Importance of foreign competition for decisions to a. introduce new products, b. to reduce costs; v) Number of 
competitors in main product line; 
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indicates that high levels of fixed investment…will not be enough to spur 
growth’63 
 
As stated above, however, their conclusions must be qualified by possible problems due 
to simultaneity bias and the failure to check for robustness of their results with country 
dummies.  
 
Commander and Svejnar (2007) include an objective measure of competition – ‘more 
than 3 competitors’ – in their regressions on otherwise subjective business climate 
indicators, which are not significant once country effects are controlled for. However, the 
competition variable is shown to have a very robust positive and significant impact on 
firm revenue even if country effects are controlled for.  
 
Escribano and Guasch (2005) do not have a real competition variable, but do check for an 
impact of regulation on productivity with the variable: ‘Number of days spent in 
Inspection and regulation related work’. It is shown to impact productivity negatively in a 
significant way in almost all specifications. The authors ascribe some 12% of the 
variation in productivity to their combined ‘Red tape, corruption and crime’ variables, 
making it the most important set of variables. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic’s 
(2005) analysis of 54 WBES surveys includes a subjective ‘degree of legal obstacles’ 
variable, which is found to be negative and significant. Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten 
and Xu’s (2006) examination of China includes the regressor ‘city-industry mean of the 
share of senior managers’ time in dealing with regulatory requirements’, which has a 
negative and significant impact on sales and employment growth, but is not a significant 
explanatory variable for firm productivity.  
 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) highlight that the impact of the regulatory 
environment is not necessarily only negative. Regulations can have positive sides as well, 
especially if they are consistently enforced. Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido find that 
consistent enforcement of regulations has a clear positive association with employment 
growth in most of the developing world, though it is insignificant for Africa. The variable 
indicating management’s time spent dealing with the authorities has an ambiguous 
impact. In the full sample, it is positive in general but less so in Africa. The authors argue 
that while there seem to be some benefits associated with accessing public services, at 
‘about 15 percent of management time, the marginal impact of additional interactions 
with the government is negative’64. On the other hand, pure red tape such as unnecessary 
delays in customs have significantly negative effects. 
 
Aterido et al. (2007) use the same two indicators representing the regulatory framework: 
the relatively objective ‘% of management’s time dealing with government regulations’ 
and the subjective ranking of the statement ‘officials interpretation of regulations is 
consistent’.65 The authors find that consistency of enforcement has a positive and 
significant effect in general, which is particularly marked for small firms. The authors 
                                                 
63 Bastos, F. and J. Nasir. 2004: 24. 
64 Hallward-Driemeier, M., S. Wallsten and L.C. Xu. 2006: 9. 
65 See Tables 6,7, 8 and 9. 
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also obtain a generally positive effect of managements’ time spent dealing with 
authorities, which they interpret as representing the benefit from obtaining public goods. 
As before, a quadratic version of the indicator suggests that the benefits are offset as the 
overall time mangers spend with officials rises beyond a certain point.66 There is also 
some evidence that large firms profit less from management time spent dealing with 
authorities67, which may partly be due to the fact that the average time large enterprises 
spend dealing with officials is longer than for small firms.  
 
Financial Constraints 
 
Examining subjective indicators, Carlin et al. (2006) find the cost of finance ranked 
above average in severity in all of their country groups68. In particular, the cost of finance 
is the highest ranked constraint in the African country group69. Alan Gelb et al.’s (2007) 
study of subjective perceptions data shows that the perceived severity of ‘access to 
finance’ constraint declines with country income level.70 The World Development Report 
2005 includes the following graph, based on a similar sample, which also indicates a 
higher reported severity of the financial constraint in poorer countries71: 
 
 
 
 
Within countries, descriptive statistics of subjective data indicate that access to finance is 
particularly problematic for less productive firms.72 Size also seems to influence the 
ability of obtaining credit from banks. Using 54 datasets from the World Business 
Environment Surveys (WBES), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) regress a 
subjective firm level indicator of financial access73 on firm size and a number of specific 
country-level institutional effects. It is found that even after controlling for a country’s 
                                                 
66 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 21. 
67 Ibid.: 38. Table 6, Column 1. 
68 Africa (10), South Asia (5), East Asia (7), Latin America and the Caribbean (7), OECD Europe (6), Central and 
Eastern Europe (8), South Eastern Europe (8) and the CIS (11) 
69 South Africa is an exception; the constraints ranked most highly there are labor regulation, skill shortages, 
macroeconomic stability and crime 
70 Gelb, A., V. Ramachandran, V., M. Kedia-Shah and G. Turner. 2007: 13. 
71 World Bank. 2004: 115. 
72 Carlin, W., M.E. Schaffer and P. Seabright. 2006: 6 (Figure 1b). 
73 ‘How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a 
moderate obstacle (3), or a major obstacle (4); 
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institutions, smaller firms report significantly higher financial obstacles than large 
firms.74 Likewise, Aterido et al (2007) find, based on objective Enterprise Survey data, 
that smaller firms have significantly less access to different forms of finance even when 
controlling for age, export status, ownership and industry.75 In line with this, the business 
climate survey data indicates that small firms tend to finance a much smaller share of 
their investments with formal credits.76 Bigsten et al. (2003) confirm that in their sample 
of African countries, close to two-thirds of micro firms are credit constrained, but only 10 
percent of large firms. The authors also find that regressions controlling for other 
important factors such as expected profitability and indebtedness, ‘the likelihood of a 
successful loan application varies with firm size’ in the same way.77 
  
Most of the studies employing regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
firm performance and the business climate include indicators representing measures of 
financial access. The most pertinent results will be outlined below, keeping in mind the 
general methodological criticisms of key papers already mentioned in the context of 
infrastructure indicators. 
 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) regress firm sales growth on a number of 
controls as well as one summary78 and 11 specific79 subjective indicators of financial 
obstacles. Entered alongside the legal and corruption summary variables, the financial 
obstacles main indicator is found to have a negative and significant effect on firm growth.  
The authors also find 6 of the 11 specific financial constraints indicators having a 
negative and significant impact, however, because each is entered individually, it is likely 
that omitted variable bias distorts these results. It should also be noted that Beck et al. do 
not calculate location-industry averages, rendering their estimates vulnerable to reverse 
causality at the firm level, as does their reliance on subjective indicators.  
 
Aterido et al.’s (2007) main objective financial constraint indicator is ‘percentage of 
investments financed externally’ and they take greater care than Beck et al. (2005) to 
reduce endogeneity at the firm level.80 Attempting to explain employment growth, they 
find that in general, a higher share of investments financed externally is associated with 
greater employment growth. Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) also find a 
significantly positive impact of their financial access variable ‘share of investment 
financed externally’ on firms of all sizes: 
 
                                                 
74 Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. 2005: 150. 
75 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 36 (Table 4) and 8. 
76 World Bank. 2004: 116. 
77 Bigsten, A. and M. Söderbom. 2005: 11. 
78 ‘How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business: no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a 
moderate obstacle (3), or a major obstacle (4); 
79 i) ‘Are collateral requirements of bans/financial institutions no obstacle (1), a minor obstacle (2), a moderate obstacle 
(3), or a major obstacle (4)?’; ii) ‘Is bank paperwork/bureaucracy no obstacle….?’; iii) ‘Are high interest rates no 
obstacle…?’; iv) ‘Is the need of special connections with banks/financial institutions no obstacle…?’; v) ‘Is banks’ lack 
of money to lend no obstacle…?’; vi) ‘Is the access to foreign banks no obstacle…?’; vii) ‘Is the access to nonbank 
equity/investors/partners no obstacle…?’; viii) ‘Is the access to specialized export finance no obstacle…?’; ix) ‘Is the 
access to ease finance for equipment no obstacle…?’; x) ‘Is inadequate credit/financial information no obstacle…?’; xi) 
‘Is the access to long term finance no obstacle…?’;  
80 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 20. 
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‘A 10 percent increase in the share of investments financed through bank loans 
(equivalent to doubling the average share) is associated with a 3 percent increase 
in employment growth. This result is robust to alternative measures of finance, 
including formal bank financing of investment to trade credit among firms.’81 
 
By contrast, Commander and Svejnar (2007) cannot find a significant effect of their 
subjective ‘cost of finance’ variable on firm revenue in their dataset from Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia.82 Dollar et al. (2005) find no significant effect of their financial 
indicator ‘access to overdraft facility’ on productivity of firms in the garment industry, 
but in an expanded sample they do find a significant and strongly positive impact of the 
variable on annual sales growth. Dollar et al. (2006) find a relatively robust positive 
relationship between ‘access to overdraft’ and the probability that a firm is an exporter.83  
Hallward-Driemeir, Wallsten and Xu’s (2006) study of the Chinese business climate 
yields no significant link between a variety of firm performance indicators and bank 
access. As pointed out above, this result may largely be due to the peculiar nature of the 
Chinese state owned banking sector which tends to be relatively inefficient and 
subsidizes unsuccessful enterprises for political reasons. Thus, it is not particularly 
surprising that access to finance has no systematic impact on variations in firm 
performance in China.84 
 
Escribano and Guasch (2005) do not include a variable indicating availability of credit to 
the firm in their equations. However, they do include one dummy indicating whether the 
firm is a publicly listed company, and another dummy that represents whether the firm is 
externally audited or not. Both indicators are significantly positively related to firm 
productivity (between 11.5 and 17 percent). 
 
In a large cross country sample, Carlin et al. (2006) find the coefficient of their subjective 
indicator of ‘cost of finance’ to be negative in both between and within-country 
regressions, and also significant in the latter. However, they argue that this result is not 
primarily due to financial constraints impacting productivity, but rather the fact that 
inherently less productive firms are rationally denied credit by financial managers (and 
complain about it). This reasoning makes intuitive sense, but Carlin et al.’s actual results 
are undermined by weaknesses in their methodology. For instance, if the above 
endogeneity bias is suspected as a problem, the authors should also have tested the 
relationship between firm productivity and the average cost of finance in the firms’ 
location and industry (rather than for the firm itself), thus alleviating the firm-level 
endogeneity. Moreover, the endogeneity mechanism they highlight seems more likely to 
impact subjective data and seems less relevant for objective data on which much of the 
significant relationships found in the literature are based. Finally, their method of 
regression on one indicator at a time is also sub-optimal because it is likely to cause 
omitted variable bias. While the finance-endogeneity effect they highlight is interesting 
and should be kept in mind when interpreting results of financial indicators, their 
                                                 
81 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 8. 
82 Except when the variable is entered separately from the other IC variables, which renders it vulnerable to omitted 
variable bias 
83 Dollar, D., M. Hallward-Driemeier and T. Mengistae. 2005. 1507. 
84 Hallward-Driemeier, M., S. Wallsten and L.C. Xu. 2006: 645. 
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particular econometric results to not by themselves undermine the significant 
relationships between financial availability and firm performance found in other papers, 
which are more pro-active in countering endogeneity problems.  
 
Corruption and Crime 
 
Carlin et al.’s summary of subjective indicators from a large number of enterprise surveys 
identifies crime and corruption as problems reported primarily in less developed 
countries. Of the two, corruption is more commonly perceived as problematic:  
 
‘Crime and/or corruption show up as important constraints in all groups of 
countries except the OECD: crime in only one-quarter of countries and 
corruption in 70%.’ 
 
The analysis of subjective firm level data by Gelb et al. (2007) shows that concern about 
corruption and crime tends to peak in the middle of developing countries’ income range. 
The authors interpret this as showing that once economies overcome utmost poverty and 
the most basic limitations related to infrastructure, finance and macroeconomic stability, 
problems of low administrative and bureaucratic capacity come to the forefront of firms’ 
concerns.  
 
Recent studies that examine the relationship between firm performance and business 
climate indicators generally find significant effects for corruption and crime indicators. 
Fisman and Svensson (2005) use their Ugandan firm-level dataset for a study focused on 
corruption and its effect on growth. Their OLS and IV regressions of sales growth on a 
corruption indicator and a variety of controls show a  
 
‘strong, robust, and negative relationship between bribery rates and the short-run 
growth rates of Ugandan firms, and […] the effect is much larger than the retarding 
effect of taxation.’ 
 
Escribano and Guasch’s (2005) study of productivity in Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua includes the explanatory variables ‘payments to deal with bureaucracy faster 
as % of sales’ and ‘number of criminal attempts suffered’. The coefficient for the number 
of crimes suffered shows the expected negative sign and is significant. However, the size 
of bribe payments has a robust positive relation with productivity. This may mean that 
firms that can afford paying (more) bribes will tend to be more productive in the first 
place and/or reap productivity advantages from their payments. However, in terms of 
policy implications it certainly does not imply that the incidence of corruption in the three 
countries should be seen as positive for productivity in general. Rather, the authors argue, 
‘it is clear that there is room for improvement in the administrative procedures followed 
in the three countries…so that no more arbitrary administrative gains in productivity 
[arise] from bribes of firms.’85 Still, the difference in the direction of the sign of the 
corruption variable in the two studies is somewhat puzzling, and further research would 
be required to reveal the source of the difference (which could be genuine cross-country 
                                                 
85 Escribano, A. and J. Guasch. 2005: 54. 
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variation in the mechanisms of corruption, or related to the somewhat different regression 
specifications). 
 
An interesting result with respect to the sign of the coefficient of corruption indicators is 
provided by Aterido et al.’s (2007) analysis of employment growth in a very large sample 
of some 80 Enterprise Surveys. They find a significantly negative effect of their bribe 
dummy, as well as alternative corruption indicators, on the growth of small, medium and 
large firms. However, the coefficient is positive for micro-firms.86 This probably 
indicates that micro-firms find it easier to escape the attention of corrupt officials and 
therefore tend to grow faster relative to larger firms if the industry-location averages of 
corruption are higher. In their study of the Chinese business climate, Hallward-Driemeier, 
Wallsten and Xu find that objectively measured corruption87 matters ‘a great deal’ for 
sales growth. Reducing ‘the mean score of corruption by one standard deviation…has a 
positive effect on sales growth by…6 percentage points’.88 However, no significant effect 
of corruption can be shown for other firm performance indicators such as productivity 
and employment growth. In Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (2005) main 
regression of sales growth on a number of controls and three summary subjective 
business climate indicators, corruption obstacles, unlike financing and legal ones, are not 
significant, although the coefficient does have the expected negative sign. The authors 
suspect this to be due to multicolinearity, in the sense that the ‘impact of corruption on 
firm growth is captured by the financial and legal obstacles.’89 In an Eastern European 
and Central Asian sample, Bastos and Nasir (2004) also find a significantly negative 
effect of their ‘rent predation’ aggregate variable, which measures a combination of 
corruption and regulation. However, the rent predation variable explains less variation of 
productivity than the infrastructure and competition measures.  
 
 
Section 3. Lessons and Ways Forward 
 
In the previous section, we have reviewed the results of firm-level studies that relate 
enterprise performance to various objective and subjective business climate indicators, 
along with a series of controls for variables such as firm characteristics, industry and 
country effects.  
 
As has been seen, these studies have provided new evidence for one of the central 
assertions of the 2005 World Development Report, namely, that a good business climate 
‘drives growth by encouraging investment and higher productivity’90 At least four 
elements of the investment climate – infrastructure, finance, corruption and crime, and 
competition and regulation – have been shown to significantly impact firm performance.  
 
                                                 
86 Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 22. 
87 Their variable is the city-industry share of the corruption score, which is constructed as the principal component of 
two variables: the ratio of bribes to sales plus the share of contract value used as bribe to get a business contract 
88 Hallward-Driemeier, M., S. Wallsten and L.C. Xu. 2006: 644. 
89 Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. 2005: 151-153. 
90 World Bank. 2004: 2 and 8. 
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Even as problems remain, the firm-level studies have already improved on the macro-
literature in a number of respects. Numerous firm-level papers have now shown that 
important within-country heterogeneity exists. Variation in local business climate does 
indeed matter for explaining differences in firm performance. Much the same point is 
made by single-country, regional business climate studies such as the one on China by 
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006). Moreover, the much larger sample sizes made possible 
by going to this disaggregated level allow for more robust results than in the macro-
studies. The information obtained from the business climate surveys is also much more 
detailed and practical than aggregate indicators, allowing, for instance, insights about the 
variation of business climate effects across regions and different types of firms.  
 
Building on this, a rich research program becomes possible. Below, we start by outlining 
the econometric issues and limitations of the current literature, and summarize the lessons 
derived from them. We then highlight what in our view are the most promising areas for 
future research. Finally, we open the debate on potential improvements in the design of 
existing survey questions. 
 
1. Econometric Lessons from the Current Literature 
 
The standard approach in the current literature based on enterprise survey data has been 
to use regression analysis to identify which – if any – business climate indicators 
determine firm performance and to what extent. Almost universally, the basic 
specification of these regressions has been:   
 
Firm Performance = β1 + β2(IC Indicators) + β3(Firm Characteristics) + β4(Additional Controls) + ε 
 
When interpreting results from these regressions, it is important to keep some basic 
characteristics and limitations of the approach in mind. Significant coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are only obtained if there is variation in these variables. Thus, the 
results presented above efficiently pinpoint existing bottlenecks that explain observed 
variations in firm performance, but they are less useful for identifying universal 
problems. For instance, Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006) find that access to 
banking services is not a significant determinant of firm performance in China. However, 
this does not mean that increasing the availability and efficiency of financial services is 
unimportant for improving Chinese productivity. As the authors point out, ‘it only means 
that the state-owned banking sector has not contributed significantly to regional firm 
growth’91. In other words, the fact that Chinese state-owned banking has not had a 
systematic impact on firm performance means that it does not show up as a determinant 
of actual variation therein. But the common lack of efficient banking services may still 
be responsible for sub-optimal levels of firm performance throughout China. This 
methodological issue is particularly relevant for studies with small samples, because 
expanding the number of observations will tend to introduce more variation and thus 
allow more general statements.  
 
                                                 
91 Hallward-Driemeier, M., S. Wallsten and L.C. Xu. 2006: 645. 
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A related issue is that of ‘camels and hippos’ raised by Hausmann and Velasco (2005) 
and discussed in Gelb et al. (2007) and others. All results are necessarily based on the 
answers of existing firms that were interviewed. However, if one only interviews those 
present (‘camels in the desert’), one may miss the crucial constraint (‘water’) of those 
who have not entered (‘no hippos in the desert’). In other words, a self-selected sample 
may imply a lack of variation in the explanatory variables that prevents us from noticing 
a critical constraint. However, in their study of perceptions data, Gelb, Ramachandran, 
Shah and Turner (2007) argue that such self-selection is hardly ever complete (e.g. 
hippos can be expected to live in a water hole at the edge of the desert), and that firms 
that choose to enter in spite of serious constraints (which may force them into costly 
evasive actions), will perceive them as particularly serious and thus introduce 
econometrically significant variation.92 Still, as it stands it is important to recognize that 
the econometric model above only informs us about the effect of constraints on the 
sample of existing firms. It is sometimes argued that the more interesting issue is rather 
the underlying industrial structure (e.g. the camel/hippo ratio in the desert) which should 
give away the most important constraint (i.e. the absence of hippos indicates that the 
main constraint is the lack of water). This, however, could only be addressed with 
completely different models such as “entry” models. 
 
Another general methodological problem is that of multicolinearity. If regressors are 
correlated with each other, estimates will be inefficient and, as Bastos and Nasir (2004) 
point out, it may be impossible to ‘know the importance of any one particular indicator 
since it may be serving as a proxy for other, more relevant variables’93. This is a 
particular problem with the business climate data, as many indicators are closely related. 
For instance, the prevalence of e-mail usage may largely move with the quality of 
electricity supply. This counsels caution when interpreting very specific indicators, and 
emphasizes the importance of choosing a good regression specification. To some extent, 
variables such as ‘prevalence of e-mail’ should be seen as proxies for broader 
infrastructure factors. Bastos and Nasir’s (2004) solution is to explicitly aggregate a 
number of specific indicators into broader measures (‘infrastructure, ‘competition’ etc.), 
in order to get clearer results at the loss of some (presumably misleading) detail. 
 
Endogeneity – the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term – is 
even more serious than multicolinearity, because it causes not only inefficiency and 
interpretative difficulties, but bias and inconsistency of the estimates. The presence of 
endogeneity undermines the validity of estimated relationships between business climate 
indicators and firm performance.  
 
It is unrealistic to assume that firm level business climate indicators are exogenous for a 
number of reasons. First, a major endogeneity problem arises if relevant explanatory 
variables are mistakenly omitted from the regression equation and also correlated with 
relevant included regressors. If this is the case, the estimated parameters of the included 
regressors will pick up some of the impact on the dependent variable of the omitted 
variables with which they are correlated. This will distort the estimates of the parameters 
                                                 
92 Gelb, A., V. Ramachandran, M. Kedia-Shah and G. Turner. 2007: 27-29. 
93 Bastos, F. and J. Nasir. 2004: 10.  
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of the included regressors, because they will now capture both their own effect and part 
of that of the correlated omitted variables. 
 
Second, better subjective and objective investment climate indicators may be associated 
with better performing firms not because they cause such firms to be more productive, 
but on the contrary, because ‘an inherently more efficient firm can work within the 
exogenously given environment to reduce inspections, power losses or days for customs 
clearance or phone lines.’94 Similarly, not only may better suited business environments 
cause firms to be more efficient, but inherently more efficient firms may also be more 
likely to have the necessary resources to identify and (re-)locate to better suited 
environments. At the aggregate level, inherently more prosperous regions may have 
greater political clout to obtain infrastructure and other business climate improvements 
from government. If one cannot fully control for these reverse causality factors, estimates 
of the effect of the investment climate on firm performance will be biased.  
 
To limit the endogeneity bias problem, the current firm level business climate literature 
suggests the following measures: 
 
o Regressions on single business climate indicators are very likely to produce biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates due to omitted variables. A sufficiently broad 
array of indicators and controls should therefore be used in regression equations. The 
selection of regressors should go from general to specific.95   
 
o Objective indicators are generally preferable to subjective ones as explanatory 
variables, because they are less vulnerable to measurement error and reverse 
causality. 96  
 
o Using location-industry or industry averages instead of (or as instruments for) the 
firm-level objective indicators can help alleviate endogeneity due to reverse 
causality.97 The idea is that while better region-industry investment climate indicators 
should explain variation in firm performance, individual firm performance has 
virtually no impact on the average-indicator. This alleviates direct reverse causality.  
 
o Country-level effects should be controlled for, either with country dummies or more 
specific country-effects variables, to avoid a contamination of the IC coefficients with 
correlated but unobserved country level effects on firm performance. 
 
o A simple two-step estimation procedure that estimates TFP as the residual of a 
production function and then attempts to explain TFP with IC indicators is potentially 
vulnerable to simultaneity bias. The problem is that in most cases the inputs of the 
production function will be correlated with the investment climate indicators, because 
                                                 
94 Dollar, D., M. Hallward-Driemeier and T. Mengistae. 2005: 9. 
95 Carlin, W., M.E. Schaffer and P. Seabright. 2006: 36. 
96 Bertrand, M.; and S. Mullainathan. 2001: 71. Also: Aterido, R., M. Hallward-Driemeier and C. Pagés. 2007: 12. 
97 See for instance: Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu, 2006. Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae, 2006. 
Escribano and Guasch, 2005. Commander and Svejnar, 2007. These authors use location-industry averages that exclude 
the respective firm. 
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the investment climate influences not only productivity per se, but also input choices 
of firms. This means that in the production function regression, the error term (i.e. 
TFP) is likely to be correlated with the regressors (labor, capital etc.) via the 
investment climate, leading to bias. If possible, this approach should thus be avoided. 
Escribano and Guasch (2005) suggest alternative procedures.  
 
o In the absence of panel data, an approach similar to Miguel, Gertler and Levine 
(2005) might be useful to alleviate some endogeneity problems. They try to explain 
industrialization (measured as the growth in manufacturing employment) at the 
district level in Indonesia over a 10 years period with social capital indicators at the 
beginning of the period (but find no effect!). A similar approach could be taken with 
indicators from ICA surveys. 
 
Finally, note that a complete assessment of the results in the literature we have surveyed 
so far would also require that we look more closely at the issue of the quality and 
relevance of the performance proxies used as dependent variables (productivity or profit, 
or sales growth etc.). While entering into the details of the literature on this topic would 
take us beyond the scope of this paper, let us note that in general measures of firm-level 
productivity are much more likely to run into problems and generate biases, as the very 
construction process of these variables make them likely to be correlated with policy 
shocks and managerial decisions (Katayama, Lu and Tybout, 2006). This is not to say 
that alternative proxies (e.g. profit, sales or employment growth) are completely free of 
these problems (see Del Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, forthcoming) but in many cases 
they appear to be preferable. 
 
 
2. The Research Agenda 
 
There remain a number of areas in which additional research could bring interesting 
results. At the theoretical level, we need to develop a better understanding of the link 
between firms’ choices and the business climate, especially in developing countries. That 
means modeling decisions about investment, R&D, employment and so on, which hinge 
on the type of constraints revealed by the existing surveys (things like credit constraints, 
infrastructure bottlenecks, level of competition in goods and labor markets, volatility of 
macroeconomic conditions, entry costs, commitment and enforcement problems or 
information issues). 
 
The type of modeling used in the literature on firms’ choices of formality might be useful 
here.98 Together with tools from industrial organization and contract theory, this 
approach should provide a good basis to formalize insights on market behavior in 
developing countries. Additionally, results could then be used to understand the very 
different shapes of firms’ distributions we see across countries, for example in terms of 
size, productivity or exporting behavior, and guide the empirical applications. 
 
                                                 
98  For instance: Rauch 1991; Straub 2005; De Paula and Sheinkman 2008. 
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At the empirical level, some of the most interesting insights in the firm-level business 
climate literature have come from recent studies that look at interactions of business 
climate indicators with firm characteristics or with each other. For instance, Hallward-
Driemeier and Aterido (2007) interact IC measures with firm sizes to obtain more 
detailed results on the impact of the business environment on the performance of 
different types of firms. Honorati and Mengistae (2007) examine the interplay of 
regulation, infrastructure, financial constraints and corruption. They obtain some 
interesting results, for instance that all three aspects have significant influence on Indian 
industrial growth, yet their effect depends on the incidence of corruption. Most existing 
firm level studies have not considered these types of interactions, and more work in this 
direction could deliver interesting outcomes that lay the groundwork for more precisely 
targeted policy recommendations.  
 
A key research goal highlighted by a number of authors is that once more surveys rounds 
become available, proper panel data regressions could test for the impact of changes in 
the business climate on productivity, factor returns, and growth. 99 For instance, whereas 
current microeconomic studies predominantly aim to assess the variation in firm 
performance due to local and cross-country variations in existing constraints, panel data 
could allow an assessment of the impact of changes (reforms) in the shape of different 
constraints on firm performance. However, with only 3 survey rounds available at most, 
it is still relatively early for these types of studies. 
 
Even the standard methodological approaches have not yet made full use of the large 
Enterprise Survey database. For instance, no best-practice study (properly accounting for 
endogeneity) of the relationship between firm productivity and the business climate has 
been carried out for the full, up-to-date Enterprise Survey database.100 Likewise, ‘little 
analysis is available on the impact of infrastructure on manufacturing firm productivity’ 
in Africa.101 More specifically still, there is a lot of scope to carry out detailed country 
studies such as that of China by Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006) or that of 
India by Honorati and Mengistae (2007) and Amin (2007). It is generally easier to 
correctly interpret econometric results in single-country studies, because outcomes are 
easier to connect to real-life circumstances and complementary data. 
 
As noted above, a recent paper by Durlauf et al. (2008) argued that the effect of 
institutions is ‘likely to be through their influence on proximate growth determinants 
(factor accumulation, in this case) rather than through their effects on technological 
innovation.’ It would be interesting to explore this question further in a micro-context. So 
far, only a few papers have used measures of capital (or human capital) accumulation as 
dependent variable and there has been no systematic comparison to the results for total 
factor productivity. 
 
                                                 
99 See for instance: Dollar, D., M. Hallward-Driemeier and T. Mengistae. 2005: 30. 
100 This has only been done with employment growth as dependent variable. See: Aterido, R., M.Hallward-Driemeier 
and C. Pagés, 2007. 
101 Bigsten, A. and M. Söderbom. 2005: 15. However, there has been at least one paper on the relationship between 
employment growth and the investment climate in Africa. 
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Future studies should make sure to extensively test the robustness of their results and if 
possible improve on the methodology in a more fundamental way. This is because even 
the current ‘best-practice’ precautions against endogeneity – such as using location-
industry averages as instruments of the firm-level indicators, regressing on multiple IC 
indicators at a time and controlling for the current country, region and industry effects – 
leave regressions vulnerable to inconsistency and bias, as Carlin et al. (2006) and others 
point out. For instance, as highlighted above, location-industry averages are used as 
instruments to alleviate endogeneity stemming from reverse causality. Yet, such 
endogeneity effects can persist at a more aggregate level as well, because of policy 
endogeneity and endogenous placement decisions of firms. For instance, using industry-
location averages one may find a strong relationship between the performance of firms 
and the average quality of telecom services of a specific industry and region. However, as 
Carlin et al. (2006) point out, regions ‘that are prosperous for a variety of other reasons 
for which it is not realistically possible to control econometrically also happen to have 
higher levels of telecom services.’ To counter this effect, a recent paper by Hallward-
Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2006) has included additional city information and sector 
dummies to at least help ‘control for those more macro issues that affect both the IC 
variable and the firm’.102 Nevertheless, the inability to sufficiently control for all factors 
implies that the endogeneity problem is likely to persist to some extent. In light of this, it 
is clear that the need arises for more creative instrumental strategies. Again some 
examples can be found in the literature, for example in Duflo and Pande (2007), who use 
geographical data to instrument for the endogenous placement of infrastructure, or Datta 
(2008) and Gibson and Rozelle (2003) who take advantage of the seemingly exogenous 
placement of road works in specific contexts to assess their impact. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the underlying assumption of most of the firm-level 
literature is that changes in the business climate which improve firm performance will 
translate into broad social benefits. Regression results based on data provided by firm-
managers are thus often straightforwardly translated into policy advice, e.g. to increase 
competition and lower regulation. In order to reduce the risk of any negative impacts, it 
may be worthwhile to consider possible competing interests when deducing policy 
recommendations. For instance, regulations may impact firm productivity negatively but 
provide benefits to non-managerial social groups.  
 
3. Improving Questionnaire Design 
 
At a fundamental level, it may also be worthwhile to re-think some of the Enterprise 
Survey questions which determine the raw data on which all analyses are based. For 
instance, in the era of mobile phones – which are particularly important in many 
developing countries – the focus on mainline telephone services is anachronistic and 
misleading. With regard to infrastructure indicators, Straub (2008) makes a number of 
suggestions for more detailed questions such as firms’ access to alternative transport 
modes (railways, airports, roads etc.) or the ownership of vehicles.103  
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There appear to be many holes in the information provided. In electricity for example, 
most information is on quality (outages and cost thereof) but basic information on cost 
and availability of service would be needed: average cost of a kilowatt-hour (KwH) of 
electricity from the public grid / cost of generators. Similarly, in water, information is 
sought on the sources of provision, but it should be complemented with the respective 
average unit costs.  
 
In transport, data on the possibility to access different types of services (roads, railroads, 
etc.), together with an assessment of their unit cost and quality, and the ownership of 
different types of vehicles, would make it possible to assess the significance of the 
transport mix chosen by firms. In the case of telecommunications, as mentioned above, 
mobile telephony is completely absent from existing surveys. Here again, data on access, 
unit cost and quality of service would be necessary. One could also wonder why 
questions geared at the use of internet are restricted to the sub-sample of service firms.104 
 
Finally, in all cases, a few key dimensions need to be added. First, information on the 
institutional nature of service providers and regulatory arrangements would be crucial 
from a policy perspective. Moreover, in a context where the geographical dimension is 
increasingly recognized to be important,105 data need to be spatially referenced. 
Obviously, the practical task of gathering this type of data (including in particular several 
hours spent with directors and managers of firms, who often have imperfect knowledge 
about the things they are asked to report) implies a trade-off between being exhaustive 
and the quality of the data collected. However, the fact that such exercises are bound to 
aim at second best results should not impede that we try to address the most obvious 
shortcomings of current surveys. 
                                                 
104 Similarly, questions on innovation are restricted to manufacturing firms. 
105 See Straub, 2008. Also, Gibson and McKenzie, 2007. 
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Annex:  Selection of Papers Analyzing the Relationship between Firm Performance and the Business climate 
 
 
 
Paper 
 
Dataset  Type of Analysis Dependent 
Variable(s) 
 Independent Variables Results / Criticism 
 
 
 
Bastos and Nasir 
(2004):  
 
‘Productivity and 
Business climate: What 
matters most’  
 
BEEPS II 
Extended 
 
(Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldova, Poland, 
Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan) 
1. Estimation of TFP and 
subsequent regression of TFP 
on three broad business 
climate measures – rent 
predation, infrastructure and 
competition – which were 
constructed from individual 
survey indicators using 
principal component analysis 
 
2. Determination of the 
relative importance of the 
three business climate 
regressors using the Kruskal 
(1987) methodology. 
- ln(TFP) Business climate Variables: 
 
-Rent predation variable, based on: 
   * Amount of unofficial payments  
      to public officials as % of sales 
   * % of senior management time  
      spent in dealing with red tape 
    * Days last year spent on  
       inspections  
 
- Infrastructure variable, based on: 
   * Days of interrupted phone serv. 
   * Days of interrupted water serv. 
   * Days of interrupted power serv. 
 
- Competition variable, based on subjective 
estimates of importance of domestic / 
foreign competition to introduce new 
products / reduce costs.  
 
Control Variables: Firm Age, Exports (% 
of sales), Foreign Ownership 
 
Results:      The business climate variables have 
the expected signs and are jointly significant.  
 
Using Kruskal’s methodology, competition is 
found to explain far more variation in firm-level 
productivity than infrastructure, which in turn 
explains more variation than rent predation. 
 
 
Criticism:      Authors do not include country 
dummies (see criticism of Commander and 
Svejnar, 2007). Two step estimation procedure 
vulnerable to simultaneous equation bias as 
outlined by Escribano and Guasch, 2005). 
 
 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Maksimovic (2005): 
 
‘Financial and Legal 
Constraints to Growth: 
Does Firm Size 
Matter’ 
54 datasets from 
the World 
Business 
Environment 
Surveys (WBES) 
1. To find out whether firm 
size determines perceptions 
on financing, legal and 
corruption constraints to 
doing business, the authors 
carry out OLS regressions of 
firm-level financing, legal 
and corruption indicators on 
firm size, controlling for 
country level financing, legal 
and corruption constraints. 
 
2. To see whether variations 
in perceived obstacles can 
- 32 mostly 
subjective 
business climate 
variables in the 
categories 
‘financial’, ‘legal’ 
and ‘corruption’.  
 
 
- Firm growth 
(percentage 
change in firm 
sales over the past 
3 years) 
Business climate variables (subjective on a 
1 to 4 scale): 
 
- Summary financing obstacle 
- Summary legal obstacle 
- Summary corruption obstacle 
 
- 29 subjective and 3 objective IC indicators 
for more specific constraints  within the 
three summary categories. 
 
Controls:      Ownership 
(government/foreign); Exporter status; 
number of competitors; industry dummies; 
Results:       
 
1. ‘Firms’ perception of the financing and 
corruption obstacles they face relates to firm 
size, with smaller firms reporting significantly 
higher obstacles than large firms. In contrast, 
smaller firms report lower legal obstacles than 
do larger firms, but these differences are not 
significant.’ 
 
2.  When entered individually, all [three 
summary] obstacles have a negative and 
significant effect on firm growth…[entered at 
the same time] financing and legal obstacles are 
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explain firm sales growth, the 
authors carry out OLS 
regressions of firm growth on 
IC indicators (each in turn, 
not all together), controlling 
with industry dummies, firm 
characteristics and country 
random effects.  
 
3. To explore how the effects 
of IC indicators differ by firm 
size, a series of size controls 
are added as explanatory 
variables.  
country specific dummies (inflation; GDP; 
GDP per capita; GDP growth); 
both significant and negative, but corruption 
loses its significance…’. Entering the 32 
individual obstacles each in turn, some of the 
financing and corruption variables, but none of 
the legal ones are significant. Two of the only 
three quasi-objective indicators are significant.  
 
3. The authors find evidence that financial 
obstacles have a much greater impact on the 
operation and growth of small firms than on that 
of large firms.  
 
 
Criticism:     Very few objective business 
climate indicators (only three quasi-objective 
ones out of 35). Also, the results on the 32 
specific IC variables are based on regressions of 
firm growth on each of the variables in turn ? 
Likely omitted variable bias! Authors do not  
Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, Mengistae 
(2005): 
 
‘Business climate and 
Firm Performance in 
Developing 
Economies’ 
Four datasets from 
the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database: 
Bangladesh, 
China, India and 
Pakistan 
1. GLS and Levinsohn/Petrin 
production function 
estimation of TFP in the 
garments industries of all 
countries. TFP is then 
regressed on the logs of a set 
of IC variables and controls. 
 
2. Regression of factor 
rewards in garments 
industries on the same 
variables plus firm 
characteristics. The 
hypothesis is that factor 
rewards will be higher were 
IC is better.  
 
3. Regression of sales growth,  
growth in fixed assets and 
growth in employment in all 
industries (pooled dataset)  on 
IC variables and controls. 
 
All regressions carried out for 
the full sample, and a sub-
sample of small firms.  
For garments 
industry only: 
 
- TFP 
- Average wage 
- Average profit 
 
For pooled data 
(all industries):  
 
- Sales growth 
- Annual growth 
rate of fixed assets 
- Annual growth 
rate of 
employment 
 Business climate variables: 
 
- log(custom days export) 
- log(custom days import) 
- log (power loss) 
- log (days to get phone) 
- log (overdraft facility) 
 
Instrumented by city-sector averages. 
 
Control variables (not all in every 
regression):  log of…distance from market; 
distance from port; population; lagged 
annual sales; lagged age of firm; fixed 
assets at start of year; last year’s 
employment; also country, year and 
industry dummies. 
Results:        ‘Business climate matters for the 
level of productivity, wages, profit rates, and the 
growth rates of output, employment and capital 
stock at the firm level – in garments and similar 
sectors…’ 
 
? IC explanatory variables show consistent 
joint significance and often individual 
significance as well. 
 
Results robust to inclusion of country dummies 
which shows that local business climate 
important!  
 
 
Criticism:     Regressions with total factor 
productivity potentially vulnerable to 
simultaneity bias. However, results largely 
confirmed with alternative firm performance 
dependent variable.  
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Escribano and Guasch 
(2005): 
 
‘Assessing the Impact 
of the Business climate 
on Productivity Using 
Firm Level Data: 
Methodology and the 
Cases of Guatemala, 
Honduras and 
Nicaragua’ 
‘Data collected for 
ICAs in… 
Guatemala, 
Honduras and 
Nicaragua’  
 
–  presumably in 
World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database 
The paper aims to develop ‘an 
appropriate and consistent 
econometric methodology to 
be used as a benchmark for 
evaluating the impact of IC 
variables on productivity at 
the firm level’. The discussed 
econometric methods are then 
applied in the cases of 
Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. 
 
The econometric analysis 
consists of a variety of 
regressions of productivity 
measures on business climate 
indicators and a set of 
controls. Results are also 
analyzed by country, age and 
size of firms.  
- 10 different 
estimations of firm 
productivity 
 
 
 
Business climate Variables: 
 
- Red Tape, Corruption and Crime:  
• No. of days spent in Inspection and 
Regulation related work 
• Fraction of sales undeclared to tax 
authorities 
• Payments to deal with bureaucracy 
faster (% of sales) 
• No. of criminal attempts suffered 
 
-Infrastructure: 
• Average duration of power 
outages (log) 
• Days to clear customs for 
imports (log) 
• Shipment losses (% of sales) 
• Dummy for internet access 
 
-Quality, Innovation & Labor Skills 
• Fraction of computer controlled 
machinery 
• Fraction of total staff engaged in 
R & D 
• Dummy for ISO quality 
certification 
• Fraction of total staff with 
secondary or higher 
• Dummy for Training beyond ‘on 
the job’ training 
 
-Finance & Corporate Governance 
• Dummy for incorporated 
Company 
• Dummy for external audit 
 
Instrumented by region-industry averages. 
 
Controls:     Age of the firm (log); Share of 
imported inputs (fraction);  country; firm 
size; 
 
Results:        
 
In the theoretical part of the paper, the authors 
highlight that analyses that use a simple two-
step procedure to first estimate firm 
productivity, and then regress this measure on 
IC variables are likely to suffer from 
simultaneity bias. They propose three different 
methods to estimate productivity. 
 
In the empirical part of the paper, the authors 
identify four ‘important categories of business 
climate (IC) variables…for the case of 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua: (a) red 
tape, corruption and crime; (b) infrastructure; (c) 
quality, innovation and labor skills; and (d) 
finance and corporate governance….The 
estimates show consistently the high impact of 
business climate on productivity. Overall, it 
accounts for over 30 percent of productivity. 
The two most impacting categories are “red 
tape, corruption and crime” and 
“infrastructure”.’ 
 
 
 39
Fisman and Svensson 
(2005): 
 
‘Are Corruption and 
Taxation Really 
Harmful to Growth? 
Firm Level Evidence’ 
Uganda Industrial 
Enterprise Survey 
 
–  presumably in 
World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database 
Regression analysis to test for 
a significant impact of 
corruption and taxes on firm 
sales growth, controlling for 
other factors.  
- Sales growth: 
[log(sales1997-
log(sales1995)]/2 
Business climate variables: 
 
- Reported bribe as share of sales 
- Reported tax as share of sales  
 
Instrumented by location-industry avg. 
 
- Index (0-5) of availability of public 
services (elect., water, telephone, waste 
disposal, paved roads) 
-Index of regulation (log of 1+ percentage 
of senior management’s time spent dealing 
with regulation) 
 
Control Variables:     ownership (foreign 
>50%); log of firm age; (log of) sales in 
1995; trade (firm exports and/or imports); 
Results:       Both taxation and bribes are found 
to have a robust, significantly negative impact 
on short-run sales growth; the retarding effect of 
bribes is thereby stronger than that of taxes. 
Foreign ownership has a positive impact on 
sales growth, as does ‘trade status’ at least in 
one specification.  
Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier and 
Mengistae (2006): 
 
‘Business climate and 
International 
Integration’ 
 
 
Eight datasets 
from the World 
Bank Enterprise 
Surveys Main 
Database: 
Bangladesh, 
Brazil, China, 
Honduras, India, 
Nicaragua, 
Pakistan and Peru. 
Probit regression of export 
status on business climate 
indicators and control 
variables (geographic, sector, 
firm characteristics). 
 
The aim is to relate business 
climate to the probability that 
a randomly chosen firm in a 
particular city exports. 
Country dummies are used in 
some specifications to obtain 
analysis of within-country 
variation. 
- Indicator 
variable of 
whether firm 
exports or not 
 
 
- Indicator 
variable of 
whether firm has 
foreign ownership 
or not 
Business climate variables: 
 
- Three objective IC indicators: days to 
clear customs; access to overdraft; losses 
from power outages. 
 
- One subjective IC indicator:  whether 
managers thought government services 
inefficient. 
 
The authors use location averages to 
instrument the variables. 
 
Control variables: distance to international 
market; distance to port; population; 
population squared; country dummies; 
sector dummies; firm size (employment).  
Results:        The authors ‘find that a sound 
business climate – as reflected in low customs 
clearance times, reliable infrastructure, and good 
financial services – makes it more likely that 
domestic firms will export, enabling the more 
productive firms to expand their scale and 
scope.’ 
 
The empirical link is largely robust to the 
inclusion of country dummies (at least joint 
significance and some individual significance 
remains), showing that local factors matter for 
the IC.  
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Carlin, Schaffer and 
Seabright (2006): 
 
‘Where are the Real 
Bottlenecks? A 
Lagrangian Approach 
to Identifying 
Constraints on Growth 
from Subjective 
Survey Data’ 
~60 World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database 
(BEEPS 2002, 
2004 and 2005 and 
PICS from 2000-
2005) 
1. Overview of descriptive 
statistics of subjective IC 
indicators 
 
2. Development of model of 
the firm to predict 
relationship between reported 
constraints and the 
characteristics of firms 
 
3. Regression of TFP on  
- TFP (defined for 
manufacturing 
firms using TFP 
residuals, or the 
firms’ self-
reported 
technological 
level) 
Business climate variables:  
 
17 subjective indicators of the severity of 
different business climate constraints on a 
four/five point scale (see Box 1)  
 
Control variables: Country dummies; 
ownership (foreign owned/state owned/new 
and private owned); big city; 
Results:  
 
1. The descriptive statistics show that physical 
infrastructure rarely rates highly as a constraint, 
problems with licensing and customs affect 
relatively few countries (esp. CIS), crime and/or 
corruption show up as important constraints in 
all groups of countries except the OECD, seven 
dimensions of the business environment that are 
ranked as of greater than average importance in 
all country groups: anti-competitive practices, 
tax rates and tax administration, access to and 
cost of finance, and policy uncertainty and 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
2. Regressions yield results largely in line with 
model predictions. Between-country regressions 
show negative and significant effects of 
Telecom, Electricity, Transport, Customs 
regulation, Mafia, Land Title and Land Access 
indicators. Once country effects are controlled 
for, however, customs regulations, transport and 
legal system indicators have perverse positive 
signs. Authors argue that this is due to 
endogeneity bias. Finance has significant 
negative impact, as predicted because it does not 
have public good characteristics but instead 
inherently unproductive firms are rationally 
denied credit (and complain about this). 
 
Criticism: Firstly, instead of objective 
indicators, the authors use subjective ones which 
are particularly vulnerable to the endogeneity 
effects they allege. Secondly, their regressions 
only use one business climate indicator at a 
time, exposing them to omitted variable bias. 
Thirdly, the posited relationship between firm 
performance and perceived indicator severity 
can only be shown for customs regulation and 
finance but not for any of the other 
disaggregated indicators. When avoiding these 
problems, other authors do find non-perverse, 
significant effects even when employing country 
dummies. Fourthly, Carlin et al. do not seem to 
use industry-location averages of their 
regressors, which could at least lessen firm-level 
endogeneity biases.  
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Hallward-Driemeier, 
Wallsten, Xu (2006): 
 
‘Ownership, business 
climate and firm 
performance’ 
China PIC Survey 
2000 (part of 
World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database) 
Regression of four different 
firm performance variables on 
largely objective business 
climate indicators (measured 
as city-industry averages) and 
controls. 
-Sales growth 
-Investment rate 
-Productivity 
-Employment 
growth 
Business climate variables: 
 
-mean loss of sales due to transport/power 
outages 
-mean share of labor that uses computers 
-mean share of R&D staff in labor 
-mean regulatory burden 
-mean corruption 
-mean share of non-permanent labor 
-mean bank access 
 
 
Control variables:    ownership (domestic 
private/foreign); logs of firm age+1 and 
firm age+1 squared; log lagged sales; log 
lagged employment; log city population and 
GDP per capita; city and industry dummies; 
Results:         
 
- ownership significant, foreign ownership more 
so than private domestic  
- no evidence that physical infrastructure matters 
significantly, but technological infrastructure 
does (expected given that hard infrastructure 
such as road and power good in China)  
- labor market flexibility weakly significant 
- No evidence that average access to finance in a 
region and industry affects performance 
(expected given inefficiency of Chinese bank 
sector) 
-Government regulatory burden and corruption 
strongly significant 
 
As expected, ownership has strong effects on 
firm performance. Relative to state ownership, 
domestic private ownership is associated with a 
higher sales growth rate and investment rate’. 
Effect of foreign ownership even larger. There 
‘is no evidence that physical infrastructure 
affects firm performance’ but ‘the impact of 
technological infrastructure appears to matter 
significantly…Labor market flexibility matters 
weakly…We do not find  
 
Criticism:     The two-step TFP regression is 
vulnerable to Escribano and Guasch 
simultaneity bias criticism. However, the 
authors also use other firm performance 
measures which produce at least approximately 
similar results.  
Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pagés 
(2007):  
 
‘Business climate and 
Employment Growth: 
The impact of Access 
to Finance, Corruption 
and Regulations 
Across Firms’ 
World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database 
1. A descriptive overview of 
firm-level employment 
growth and business climate 
data from over 100 countries, 
focusing in particular on 
differences by firm size.  
 
2. Regression of employment 
growth on IC constraints 
controlling for a variety of 
firm characteristics (esp. size) 
and other factors.  
 
- Firm 
Employment 
Growth  
 
[change in the 
enterprise’s 
permanent 
employment 
during the period t 
and three years 
before, divided by 
the firm’s simple 
average of 
Business climate variables: 
 
- Finance:  
• Firm has overdraft facility 
• % of sales sold on credit 
• % of working capital financed 
externally 
• % of investments financed externally 
 
-Regulations: 
• Log of days to get an operating 
license last 2 years 
• % of management’s time dealing 
Results:      ‘The results indicate significant 
differences across size categories of firms – both 
in terms of differences in objective conditions 
faced by firms and in terms of non-linearities in 
the impact of these conditions. Low access to 
finance, corruption, poorly developed business 
regulations and infrastructure bottlenecks shift 
downward the size distribution of employment. 
Low access to finance and ineffective business 
regulations reduce the growth of all firms, 
especially micro and small firms. Corruption 
and poor infrastructure create growth 
bottlenecks for medium and large firms. The 
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permanent 
workers during the 
same period. The 
measure is 
symmetric and 
bounded by +/-2]  
with gov’t regulation 
• log of days spent on inspections 
last year 
• log of average days to obtain 
imports…last year 
• log of average days to get 
exports thru custom last year 
• log of total days spent on labor 
inspections last year 
 
-Corruption 
• Firms in comparable activities 
bribe to get things done (yes/no) 
• % of sales on bribes to get things 
done by similar firms 
• Similar firms give gifts to 
officials (yes/no) 
• % of government contracts on 
bribes by comparable firms 
 
-Infrastructure 
• Power outages during the last 
year (log days) 
• % of sales lost due to power 
outages last year 
• Log days of no water last year  
 
Authors use country-city-sector-size 
averages of these variables. 
 
Controls:     Firm size (micro/small 
/medium/large); firm age (young/ 
mature/old); location (large and small 
cities); ownership (foreign/government); 
exporter; industry; country; 
results also reinforce the  importance of 
differentiating the impact across size classes of 
firms that allow for the micro firms (less than 10 
employees) to be different from ‘small’ firms’ 
 
‘our estimates suggest that a weak business 
climate reduces overall employment in the 
business sector…firms may be confined to 
industries with limited innovation and growth 
opportunities. In addition, a larger share of firms 
may remain informal or semi-informal, reducing 
the capacity of the state of collecting taxes and 
paying for fundamental inputs for development 
such as education.’ 
 
Hallward-Driemeir and 
Aterido (2007):  
 
‘Impact of Access to 
Finance, Corruption 
and Infrastructure on 
Employment Growth: 
Putting Africa in 
Context’ 
World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys 
Main Database, 
with a focus on the 
African datasets 
contained therein  
1. Descriptive overview of 
how the African employment 
growth rate compares to the 
rest of the world, and how 
specific business climate 
constraints differ across 
regions and different types of 
firms.  
 
2. For both a sample of 
African countries and one of 
- Employment 
Growth 
 
-Capital Intensity 
 
-Change in Capital 
Intensity 
Business climate variables: 
 
-share of investments financed with bank 
loans 
-days without power 
-management time with officials 
-frequency of bribes to ‘get things done’ 
 
Alternative specifications include: days to 
clear import customs; consistency of 
enforcement of regulations; share of sales 
Results:        ‘Firms in Africa do face greater 
obstacles in terms of finance, infrastructure, 
public services and governance. ….[However,] 
the more challenging business environment 
conditions [do not translate into lower average 
growth compared to other developing countries, 
but they] are associated with shifting down the 
[firm] size distribution, lowering the relative 
growth of larger firms, or in some cases 
expanding micro-firms’ 
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other developing countries, 
the authors regress 
employment growth and other 
outcome variables on a set of 
business climate indicators 
and controls.  
on credit; 
 
Control variables (not all in every 
regression):  firm size,  firm age, export 
status, foreign ownership, sector controls; 
survey dummies, country controls; 
This may be because there are incentives to 
remain small e.g. because bad transport 
infrastructure creates demand-pockets for small 
suppliers, being small and informal minimizes 
contact with corrupt state etc.  
Commander and 
Svejnar (2007):  
 
‘Do Institutions, 
Ownership, Exporting 
and Competition 
Explain Firm 
Performance? 
Evidence from 26 
Transition Countries’ 
BEEPS II and 
BEEPS III 
 
First cross 
sectional analyses, 
but authors also 
construct panel 
subset with 
approx. 1300 firms 
1. Authors regress log of firm 
sales revenues on subjective 
business climate indicators 
and a set of controls (OLS 
and IV)  
 
2. Using a constructed panel 
of 1300 firms, the authors 
regress the change of 
revenues between 2002 and 
2005 on the 2002-05 rate of 
change of labor and capital 
and on the initial 2002 levels 
of the business environment 
constraints and structural 
variables (OLS) 
1. Log of Firm 
sales revenues 
 
 
2. Log of Change 
in firm sales 
revenues 
 
Firm level IC variables from BEEPS 
(subjective perceptions of managers on 1-4 
scale): 
 
- cost of financing  
- tax rates 
- custom/foreign trade regulations 
- business licencing&permit 
- macroeconomic instability 
- functioning of the judiciary 
- corruption 
- street crime theft & disorder 
- anti-competitive practices 
- infrastructure 
 
Country level IC variables (in separate 
regressions): 
 
- 12 Doing Business variables 
- 10 Heritage Foundation indices of 
economic freedom  
 
Control variables (not all in every 
regression):  levels of capital and labor 
inputs; categories of ownership (privatized; 
new private; foreign), export orientation of 
firm; log of exports/sales. Note that main 
controls are replaced by Instrumental 
Variables.   
 
 
Results:         
- ‘Overall [the authors] show that country 
effects…matter for firm performance but that 
differences in the business environment 
constraints observed across firms within 
countries do not.’ 
 
-Foreign ownership found to have positive effect 
on firm performance, but domestic private 
ownership not 
 
-Export orientation found to have positive effect 
only in simple specification, not if authors 
control for ownership 
 
Criticism:            The authors use only 
subjective, perception based business climate 
indicators. This may be sub-optimal. Objective 
business climate indicators, such as the time 
required to clear customs, have been found to be 
significant even with the inclusion of country 
dummies (see for instance Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, Mengistae, 2005). Subjective 
business climate indicators may be sub-optimal 
because systematic variations in perceptions in 
the cross-country dataset are largely a function 
of broad business confidence related to macro 
factors such as political and macroeconomic 
stability or the financial system. Such country 
level effects are largely captured by country 
dummies. Once firm characteristics (such as 
size, age etc.) are also controlled for, the 
remaining variation in perception based 
indicators of specific business climate 
constraints may be largely due to quasi-random 
factors such as the managers’ personality. This 
could explain why these subjective indicators do 
not show up as significant, although concrete 
objective measures of the business climate may 
do.  
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Honorati and 
Mengistae (2007):  
 
‘Corruption, the 
Business Environment, 
and Small Business 
Growth in India’ 
Indian Firm 
Analysis and 
Competitiveness 
Survey, 2002 and 
2005 
1. Descriptive analysis of 
objective and subjective data. 
 
2. Regressions analysis to 
examine the effects of 
corruption, labor regulation, 
access to finance and the 
quality of power supply on 
the growth of manufacturing 
businesses in India. 
 
 
 
Annual sales 
growth 
Business climate variables: 
 
- lagged profitability (finance proxy) 
- lagged indebtedness (finance proxy) 
- indicators of corruption, labor regulation 
and power shortages 
 
Controls: industry, state and year dummies; 
initial size; 
Results: 
 
1. The authors find a pattern whereby ‘the better 
performing states are also better in every 
important aspect of their business 
environment…low-income, low-growth states 
have the worst indicators of all institutional 
variables except for labor regulation’ 
 
2. Regression results show that ‘average 
business growth rate is lower where labor 
regulation is greater, power shortages are more 
severe, and financial constraints 
stronger…[moreover] each of the three factors 
on business growth depends on the incidence of 
corruption….sales growth is constrained by 
cash-flow only in businesses that are not 
affected by labor regulation, power shortages or 
corruption.’  The authors interpret this ‘as 
indication that corruption is a proxy for 
something more fundamental than the payments 
of bribes, namely, the quality of property rights 
institutions in the sense of Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005)’. Their results are consistent 
‘with the…view that the quality of property 
rights institutions exerts more abiding influence 
on economic outcomes than the quality of 
contracting institutions…’  
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